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TERRORISM AND ASSOCIATIONS 
Ashutosh Bhagwat∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The domestic manifestation of the War on Terror has produced the most 
difficult and sustained set of controversies regarding the limits on First 
Amendment protections for political speech and association since the anti-
Communist crusades of the Red Scare and McCarthy eras. An examination of 
the types of domestic terrorism prosecutions that have become common since 
the September 11 attacks reveals continuing, unresolved conflicts between 
national security needs and traditional protections for speech and (especially) 
associational freedoms. Yet the courts have barely begun to acknowledge, 
much less address, these serious issues. In the Supreme Court’s only sustained 
engagement with these problems, the 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, the majority largely avoided the hard questions by simply 
asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the federal statute forbidding the provision 
of material support to foreign terrorist organizations, does not directly burden 
either the freedom of speech or freedom of association. Lower courts have 
performed even more poorly, generally rejecting powerful speech and 
association claims with bare assertions that “there is no First Amendment 
right . . . to support terrorists.” 
This Article has taken as its major goal identifying and analyzing the First 
Amendment issues raised by the domestic War on Terror, focusing especially 
on the role of freedom of association in this context. Freedom of association 
has historically been a critical and basic First Amendment right, central to the 
process of democratic self-governance that the First Amendment protects. The 
right of association is also deeply implicated in many domestic terrorism 
prosecutions, since the essence of those prosecutions is an act of association, 
often combined with speech. Finally, the judiciary’s bare assertions that 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis. 
B.A., 1986, Yale University; J.D., 1990, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Ben Strauss and Elise 
Weinberg for excellent research assistance. Thanks also to Deven Desai, Chris Elmendorf, Carlton Larson, and 
participants at the Freedom of Expression Conference at the Yale Law School for extremely helpful 
comments, including especially to John Inazu for serving as discussant for this Article and providing 
invaluable feedback. 
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“material support” or financial contributions do not constitute association 
cannot be sustained given both first principles and well-developed law outside 
the context of terrorism. In short, in this area the courts have failed in their 
basic job of honestly engaging with the law. 
Ultimately, however, I conclude here that there does exist a clear, textually 
and historically justifiable basis for limiting constitutional protections for 
terrorist and other violent groups. The principle derives from the textual roots 
of the freedom of association, which lies in the Assembly Clause of the First 
Amendment. The Assembly Clause, unlike the Free Speech Clause, explicitly 
protects only a right “peaceably to assemble,” and so excludes violent groups. 
This simple principle, completely missed by the courts, serves to reconcile most 
terrorism prosecutions with the First Amendment. It cannot, of course, resolve 
all issues, especially when a prosecution is based primarily on speech, not 
association, but it does much of the work. There also remain some difficult and 
complicated issues of definition and implementation, on which I provide some 
thoughts. But the basic argument advanced here is quite simple: the freedom of 
association and assembly protects only peaceable association and assembly; 
and terrorists are not peaceable. 
INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade has now passed since the attacks of September 11, 
2001, fully inaugurated the Age of Terror. In the early years after the attacks, 
aside from the immigration sweep that followed immediately, U.S. 
antiterrorism policy was focused primarily on threats from abroad, including, 
notably, the wars in Afghanistan and (at least purportedly) Iraq. While those 
events raised some fascinating issues about the scope of executive authority1 
and about the geographic reach of the Constitution,2 it was relatively rare that 
the individual liberties provisions of the Bill of Rights were directly 
 
 1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (prohibiting “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment” by executive officials of individuals in custody); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568–69 
(2006) (discussing the President’s issuance of a comprehensive military order governing the use of military 
commissions to try noncitizens in the War on Terror); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) 
(discussing whether the President has the authority to detain “enemy combatants” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1901 (Dec. 30, 
2005) (asserting that “situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly 
under his constitutional grants of executive power”).  
 2 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus reaches enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).  
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implicated.3 In subsequent years, however, the federal government initiated a 
series of judicial actions, including criminal prosecutions, directed at alleged 
terrorists and supporters of terrorism within the United States.4 These actions 
have in turn generated a large number of constitutional disputes regarding the 
consistency of these legal claims with the Bill of Rights, especially the speech 
and association rights protected by the First Amendment. To date, the Supreme 
Court has had only one occasion to address these issues: its 2010 decision in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.5 In Humanitarian Law Project, the 
Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), the 
so-called material-support statute, which bans the provision of material support 
to designated foreign terrorist organizations.6 The Humanitarian Law Project 
decision, however, did very little to clarify the law regarding the interaction 
between First Amendment rights and antiterrorism measures; indeed, the 
decision, if anything, increased the already high levels of confusion and 
uncertainty. 
Despite the lack of guidance from above, the lower federal courts have, of 
course, necessarily confronted and resolved many First Amendment issues in 
the context of terrorism prosecutions. These cases and disputes are discussed in 
more detail in Part II of this Article, but the bottom line is clear: the First 
Amendment has been irrelevant. Lower courts have not only consistently 
rejected First Amendment defenses, they have generally dismissed them as 
insubstantial. A closer look at these cases demonstrates, however, that under 
current law, the First Amendment claims in these cases, especially those 
brought under the freedom of association, are in fact quite weighty. Courts 
have avoided them only by contorting doctrine and, in some cases, accepting 
arguments that are grossly inconsistent with First Amendment law in other 
factual contexts. In short, the War on Terror has forced the courts to twist the 
First Amendment into a pretzel. 
In this Article, I aim to abate some of this confusion and to build a 
sustainable framework within which First Amendment challenges to 
antiterrorism measures can be evaluated. My focus is on freedom of 
association, though in the course of discussing association issues, I necessarily 
 
 3 The primary counterexample is the controversy over whether the Bush Administration’s domestic 
warrantless wiretapping program violated the Fourth Amendment. See Evan Tsen Lee, The Legality of the NSA 
Wiretapping Program, 12 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 40–41 (2006). 
 4 See infra Part II.  
 5 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 6 See id. at 2711; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). 
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have to consider some related free speech issues as well—indeed, one of my 
main points is that speech and association issues are deeply entangled in these 
situations, and contrary to the way courts treat them, must be considered 
together.7 As I suggested earlier, my conclusion is that the associational claims 
raised in this area are far from insubstantial; indeed, under extant doctrine, 
many of them are probably valid. Nonetheless, I conclude that the courts have 
probably been correct to reject most (though by no means all) of the First 
Amendment challenges to antiterrorism prosecutions. The problem is that the 
courts are doing this for the wrong reasons, twisting doctrine to reach 
intellectually unsustainable conclusions. The downsides to this approach—
other than rule-of-law concerns—are that first, it leads courts to reject even 
some legitimate claims; and second, it threatens to undermine First 
Amendment rights in other areas. 
I conclude by arguing that instead of ignoring individual associational 
rights or narrowing their scope in indefensible ways, courts should focus their 
attention on what kinds of associations, what kinds of groups are protected by 
the First Amendment, and more particularly, whether certain kinds of 
organizations may be categorically excluded. The building blocks of such an 
approach can be found in the text and history of the First Amendment itself 
and in particular in the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment. The modern 
right of association, I demonstrate, is rooted in the Assembly Clause. 
Importantly, however, the Assembly Clause (unlike the Free Speech Clause) 
only protects the right “peaceably to assemble,”8 and so explicitly excludes 
violent groups. This fact, and the recognition that terrorist groups are, of 
course, not peaceable, serves to reconcile most terrorism prosecutions with the 
First Amendment without doing damage to either logic or legitimate rights. 
This Article develops these ideas more fully and demonstrates that such an 
approach can preserve important First Amendment principles without reaching 
absurd results, such as supporting a constitutional right to fund Al Qaeda. 
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the Supreme Court’s Humanitarian Law 
Project decision. Part II presents a series of case studies from the domestic 
War on Terror, illustrating how the lower courts have, and have not, 
confronted the First Amendment issues raised by them. Part III examines the 
grave uncertainties these cases reveal regarding the scope and application of 
 
 7 For a more general discussion of the relationship between the speech and association rights, see 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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First Amendment rights in the context of the War on Terror. Part IV articulates 
a new way forward, which seeks to identify limits on the sorts of groups 
entitled to constitutional protection based on the language and purposes of the 
First Amendment. Finally, Part V examines some of the difficult boundary 
problems raised by any proposal to categorically restrict the scope of First 
Amendment protections. 
I. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT: TERRORISM TRUMPS THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
As the discussion in the following section indicates, since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the federal courts have decided many cases, arising from 
a variety of contexts, touching upon the domestic War on Terror. The Supreme 
Court, however, has directly faced constitutional issues arising from domestic 
antiterrorism efforts in only one case: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.9 
The Humanitarian Law Project decision therefore provides the starting point 
for all modern discussions of First Amendment constraints on antiterrorism 
prosecutions, and it is worthy of some sustained attention. 
A. The Humanitarian Law Project Decision 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
arose out of a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the so-called 
material-support statute, which prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”10 The statute in turn 
defines “material support or resources” broadly, to include, inter alia, any and 
all property, services, training, expert advice, and personnel.11 A foreign 
terrorist organization (FTO) is defined as “an organization designated as a 
terrorist organization”12 by the Secretary of State, pursuant to her authority 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1189.13 The plaintiffs in the litigation were U.S. citizens and 
organizations who wished to provide expert training and advice to support the 
 
 9 See 130 S. Ct. at 2711. 
 10 See id. at 2712 & n.1. The material-support statute was originally enacted as part of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 303(a), § 2339B(a)(1), 110 Stat. 
1214, 1250. It thus predates the September 11 attacks, though the number of prosecutions under the statute 
appear to have increased dramatically following the attacks. See Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s 
Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 297, 301 (2008). 
 11 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2713 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 12 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2012). 
 13 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012). 
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nonviolent activities of two designated FTOs: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), an organization seeking the establishment of an independent Kurdish 
state in Turkey, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil 
Tigers), a now defunct organization that sought the establishment of an 
independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.14 The plaintiffs claimed that application 
of the material-support statute to their activities violated their rights to freedom 
of speech and freedom of association protected by the First Amendment and 
that the statute was void for vagueness.15 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts, rejected all of these claims by a 6–3 vote.16 
The majority’s analysis proceeded in several steps. First, the Court rejected 
a nonconstitutional claim that the statute should be interpreted to require that 
defendants possess an intent to further an FTO’s illegal activities, at least when 
the statute was applied to speech.17 The Court concluded that the statutory 
language did not support such a limiting construction.18 The Court then 
rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge.19 It held that the statute’s definition 
of “training” and “expert advice” clearly covered the plaintiffs’ proposed 
activities, and, critically, it held that the statute’s definitions of “personnel” and 
“service” clearly excluded independent advocacy in support of an FTO, 
thereby providing a safe harbor so long as an individual’s activities are not 
directed by or coordinated with an FTO.20 In response to the plaintiffs’ 
objection that this reading in turn created fatal ambiguity about the degree of 
coordination or direction that would cross the line into material support, the 
Court simply responded that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to 
properly raise this issue.21 In other words, the majority essentially ducked this, 
as we shall see, crucial question. 
The majority then turned to the First Amendment. It began, building on its 
vagueness analysis, by emphasizing that the material-support statute was not a 
flat restriction on political speech because it permitted independent advocacy 
in support of FTOs.22 However, the Court acknowledged that the statute 
imposed a content-based restriction on speech, and so “more rigorous scrutiny” 
 
 14 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2713–14. 
 15 Id. at 2714. 
 16 See id. at 2712, 2719, 2730–31. 
 17 See id. at 2717–18. 
 18 See id. 
 19 Id. at 2719. 
 20 Id. at 2719–22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21 See id. at 2722. 
 22 Id. at 2722–23. 
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than intermediate scrutiny was required (though the majority opinion coyly 
never used the phrase “strict scrutiny”).23 The majority then quickly concluded 
that the government’s objective here, to combat terrorism, was sufficiently 
strong (presumably compelling, though in keeping with its failure to say 
whether it is or is not applying strict scrutiny, the Court never used that term) 
to meet the applicable standard of review.24 The difficult question was one of 
fit—whether the statute was “necessary to further that interest.”25 Ultimately, 
the Court concluded that it was necessary.26 The Court pointed out that even 
material support for an FTO’s legal activities advances terrorism because it 
“frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent 
ends,” and “[i]t also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist 
groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit 
members, and to raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”27 
In a similar vein, the Court argued that providing material support to FTOs 
“also furthers terrorism by straining the United States’ relationships with its 
allies and undermining cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist 
attacks.”28 Finally, the Court granted deference to Congress and the President 
on the necessity of the material-support statute, given the national security and 
foreign relations implications of the case.29 However, the Court closed this 
section of the analysis with a limiting cautionary statement: 
[W]e in no way suggest that a regulation of independent speech 
would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to 
show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations. We 
also do not suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition 
on material support at issue here to domestic organizations.30 
Having polished off the free speech claim, the majority then turned to 
freedom of association. Here, the Court was brief, almost dismissive.31 It 
 
 23 See id. at 2724. 
 24 See id. (explaining that “the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the 
highest order”). 
 25 See id. (quoting Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project at 51, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705 (Nos. 08-148 & 09–89)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26 See id. at 2728–29 (“Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at stake . . . it 
was necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert advice, personnel and 
services to foreign terrorist groups . . . .”). 
 27 Id. at 2725. 
 28 Id. at 2726. 
 29 Id. at 2727. 
 30 Id. at 2730. 
 31 The Court spent a mere three paragraphs discussing the freedom of association claim. See id. at 2730–
31. 
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rejected the claim on the simple grounds that the material-support “statute does 
not penalize mere association with a foreign terrorist organization,” because it 
does not prohibit membership in an FTO, merely the provision of material 
support.32 
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor.33 From the beginning, the tone of the dissent is dramatically 
different from the majority. Breyer emphasized that the plaintiffs’ activities 
were political and so fell within the core of the First Amendment’s 
protections.34 He also repeatedly described the activities as implicating rights 
of both speech and association, rather than treating the associational claim as a 
poor stepchild like the majority did.35 Indeed, Breyer emphatically rejected the 
majority’s conclusion that the statute was constitutional because it prohibits 
only speech coordinated with an FTO, pointing out that the First Amendment, 
“after all, also protects the freedom of association,” and citing cases that 
describe the right of freedom of assembly as an independent and “cognate” 
right.36 The dissent also pointed out that the Court’s prior precedent had clearly 
upheld a right to associate with groups that themselves use “unlawful means” 
to achieve their political goals.37 Finally, Justice Breyer argued that the 
government’s primary arguments in defense of the material-support statute—
that even peaceful support to FTOs is “fungible,” and that support for FTOs 
can “legitimize” them—are either factually questionable or contrary to 
precedent.38 Because it found the statute, as interpreted by the government, to 
violate the First Amendment, the dissent would have imposed a limiting 
construction “criminalizing First-Amendment-protected pure speech and 
association only when the defendant knows or intends that those activities will 
assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.”39 
B. Implications 
Several significant questions are raised by the Humanitarian Law Project 
Court’s First Amendment analysis. First, it is striking that despite the Court’s 
 
 32 Id. at 2730. 
 33 See id. at 2731 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 34 Id. at 2732. 
 35 Id. at 2732–33. 
 36 Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 364 (1937)). 
 37 Id. at 2733 (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 908; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961)). 
 38 See id. at 2735–37 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39 Id. at 2739–40. 
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invocation of strict scrutiny (albeit without naming it as such), it deferred to 
Congress and the President’s factual assertions regarding the necessity of the 
law. Such a deferential posture in the context of heightened scrutiny is 
inconsistent with most modern law40 and brings to mind such questionable 
decisions as Korematsu v. United States41 and Dennis v. United States42 in 
which the Court sacrificed basic civil liberties in the name of national security 
and deference to political and military authorities. The sweeping deference 
language of the Humanitarian Law Project majority opinion raises the 
possibility that in the Age of Terror, the Court will retreat to a similar 
constitutional calculus. 
In other ways, however, the Humanitarian Law Project Court took a 
notably more speech-protective stance than it had to. Most significantly, by 
applying rigorous scrutiny, the Court implicitly but clearly rejected any 
suggestion that the speech at issue was categorically unprotected under current 
First Amendment doctrine, either as “incitement” under the modern 
Brandenburg test43 or as speech which is “an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.”44 The Court also, as noted earlier, 
explicitly excluded independent advocacy in support of FTOs from the reach 
of the material-support statute and raised doubts about whether the statute 
could constitutionally be applied to domestic organizations, even terrorist 
ones.45 Ultimately, then, Humanitarian Law Project is probably best read as an 
important but, at least for the time being, limited holding regarding the scope 
of free speech in the context of the War on Terror. 
But this is precisely the problem: Humanitarian Law Project is clearly a 
holding primarily about speech with the right of association treated merely as 
 
 40 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512–13 (2005) (noting that the Court has “refused to 
defer to state officials’ judgments on race in other areas where those officials traditionally exercised substantial 
discretion”); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (explaining that courts must 
independently review legislative actions that impinge on the First Amendment). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to a law school’s educational judgment about the value of diversity).  
 41 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (determining it was within “the war power of Congress and the 
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area”). 
 42 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (upholding prosecution of Communist Party leadership as consistent with 
the First Amendment). 
 43 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (explaining that the First Amendment does “not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action”). 
 44 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
761–62 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 45 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
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an afterthought. But on the facts of the case, this is quite odd. It is true that the 
plaintiffs themselves, to some extent, framed their case around free speech by 
emphasizing the training and advice they wanted to provide to FTOs; but 
central to the dispute (as the majority itself recognized repeatedly) was the fact 
that the plaintiffs wished to act in coordination with—i.e., in association 
with46—FTOs, rather than simply advocating on their behalf independently. In 
other words, it was the plaintiffs’ association rather than their speech that 
brought them within the scope of the material-support statute. Yet the 
majority’s analysis of association was, as we have seen, utterly cursory. 
In many ways, this neglect of the associational right is typical of the 
Court’s recent performance and has already been extensively discussed (and 
criticized) in the literature.47 The result of this neglect, however, is to create 
profound confusion. For example, one clear and obvious implication of the 
Court’s reasoning in rejecting the associational claim in Humanitarian Law 
Project is that the right of association protects membership in an organization 
but not the provision of material support. Lower courts have largely mimicked 
this reasoning.48 The difficulty is that this conclusion is entirely inconsistent 
with interpretations of the associational right in other contexts.49 In addition, as 
noted earlier, the Court completely avoided addressing the difficult question of 
what level of communication or direction between an individual and an FTO 
crosses the line into “coordination” and so brings the individual within the 
scope of the material-support statute.50 Yet these questions lie at the heart of 
many First Amendment claims raised in modern terrorism prosecutions. In 
sum, far from clarifying the scope of First Amendment rights in the context of 
terrorism, Humanitarian Law Project largely obfuscated or avoided the issues. 
As we shall now see, the net effect of Humanitarian Law Project was therefore 
merely to add to the confusion already rampant in the lower courts. 
 
 46 See id. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 47 See generally JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 1–2 
(2012) (“[The] freedom of assembly has become little more than a historical footnote in American law and 
political theory.”); Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 980 (explaining that the freedom of assembly and right to petition 
the government “have traditionally been the poor stepchildren of First American law, neglected and ignored”). 
 48 See infra Part II. 
 49 See infra text accompanying notes 217–24. 
 50 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
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II. TERRORISM IN THE LOWER COURTS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ABSENTIA 
To understand the nature of the First Amendment problems raised by 
modern antiterrorism cases, it is necessary to have some sense of the nature of 
those cases. I therefore begin this section by laying out some recent, prominent 
terrorism cases that raise difficult First Amendment issues. It should be noted 
that I focus here on cases that primarily target speech or association, as 
opposed to targeting the actions of individuals such as Major Nidal Malik 
Hasan51 or Faisal Shahzad52 who engaged in, or attempted to engage in, 
violence, and whose prosecutions, of course, raise no serious First Amendment 
concerns. These cases tend to fall into one of two groups. The first is made up 
of antiterrorism prosecutions, generally brought pursuant to either 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B, the material-support statute upheld in Humanitarian Law Project, or 
its sibling, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which prohibits the provision of material 
support or resources “knowing or intending that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out” various violations53 (i.e., this statute 
prohibits material support intended to aid actual acts of terrorism, as opposed 
to material support to FTOs). The second set of cases involves organizations 
seeking to challenge their designations as terrorist organizations. 
A. The Cases 
1. Material-Support Prosecutions Based on Speech 
a. Tarek Mehanna 
Tarek Mehanna is a native-born U.S. citizen, with a doctorate in 
pharmacology, who lived with his parents in the upscale suburb of Sudbury, 
Massachusetts.54 In December of 2011, Mehanna was convicted after a jury 
 
 51 Hasan is the convicted gunman in the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings. See Nidal Malik Hasan, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/nidal_malik_hasan/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2014); see also Manny Fernandez, Defendant in Fort Hood Shooting Case Admits Being 
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2013, at A14. 
 52 Shahzad was convicted of attempting to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in May of 2010. See 
Faisal Shahzad, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/faisal_shahzad/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); see also Declan Walsh, 4 Are Acquitted by Pakistan in Times Square 
Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012, at A13. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). 
 54 See Innokenty Pyetranker, Sharing Translations or Supporting Terror? An Analysis of Tarek Mehanna 
in the Aftermath of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF, Spring 2012, at 21, 21; 
Abby Goodnough & Liz Robbins, Massachusetts Man Is Held on Charges of Plotting Attacks, Including One 
at a Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A21. 
BHAGWAT GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/7/2014 3:04 PM 
592 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:581 
trial on multiple counts of providing material support to terrorism (as well as 
counts involving lying to the FBI).55 Mehanna’s prosecution was based in part 
on his translation from Arabic, and distribution on the Internet, of jihadi 
literature (in particular, a text titled 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad 
and a video depicting Al Qaeda activities and propaganda involving Iraq).56 
The prosecution also introduced evidence that Mehanna flew to Yemen in 
2004 seeking to obtain weapons training at a terrorist training camp, but 
conceded that he did not succeed in locating a camp (Mehanna denied that he 
was seeking weapons training).57 A main thrust of the government’s case at the 
trial court level, however, was clearly the translation and distribution of jihadi 
materials.58 Importantly, the government provided no proof that Mehanna 
coordinated his propaganda with any members of Al Qaeda or any other 
FTO.59 Indeed, it is quite unclear whether Mehanna had any direct contact at 
all with Al Qaeda members.60 Instead, the government’s case relied on 
evidence that Mehanna described himself as Al Qaeda’s “English Wing”61 and 
on other statements Mehanna made expressing support for Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda.62 
 
 55 See Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 38; Abby Goodnough, U.S. Citizen Is Convicted in Plot to Support Al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A26. 
 56 See Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 36 (citing Second Superseding Indictment at 1, 8, 15–16, United 
States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011), 2010 WL 2516469); see also Nikolas Abel, 
Note, United States vs. Mehanna, the First Amendment, and Material Support in the War on Terror, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 711, 732 (2013) (citing Government’s Proffer and Memorandum in Support of Detention at 64–66, 
Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass 2011)).  
 57 See Abel, supra note 56, at 731 & n.169 (citing Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 56, at 5).  
 58 See id. at 732 (citing Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 56, at 8). During the late stages of the 
editorial process for this Article, the First Circuit issued its opinion affirming Mehanna’s conviction in full. 
See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). Interestingly, the appellate court’s decision to 
affirm Mehanna’s conviction on the terrorism counts relied entirely on his 2004 trip to Yemen. See id. at 46. 
Indeed ,the court came close to conceding that the government’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that 
Mehanna’s translation and speech activities were coordinated with Al Qaeda. See id. at 50–51. The court 
concluded that the mass of evidence that had been admitted at trial regarding the government’s “translation-as-
material-support theory” was irrelevant because the jury was properly instructed, and the factual evidence 
regarding Mehanna’s Yemen trip was sufficient to support his conviction. Id. at 51. Whatever the merits of this 
analysis, it remains true that at trial, before the convicting jury, the government heavily emphasized 
Mehanna’s speech. 
 59 See id. at 739–40. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. at 732 & n.175 (quoting Government’s Proffer and Memorandum in Support of Detention, supra 
note 56, at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 See Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 21–22. 
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Mehanna’s attorneys unsurprisingly sought to have the material-support 
charges against Mehanna dismissed on First Amendment grounds.63 The 
primary thrust of his argument was that the Humanitarian Law Project 
decision required proof of coordination with an FTO (or in the case of 
§ 2339A, with known terrorists) and that the overt acts for which Mehanna had 
been indicted constituted protected, independent advocacy.64 The 
government’s response was to deny that coordination was a required element 
of a § 2339A violation, and that in any event, “coordination” did not require 
direct contact between the defendant and an FTO—it was sufficient for a 
defendant to respond to an FTO’s call for assistance, and believe that he was 
assisting the organization.65 The district court denied Mehanna’s motion to 
dismiss, and ultimately Mehanna was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 
seventeen-and-a-half years in prison.66 
b. Javed Iqbal and Laleh Elahwal 
Javed Iqbal is a Pakistani national who has resided in the United States 
since he was a teenager.67 Iqbal lived on Staten Island, New York, and ran a 
business providing specialized satellite programming.68 In 2006, Iqbal was 
arrested and charged with material support for terrorism.69 The gravamen of 
the charge was that as part of his business, Iqbal retransmitted the signal of Al 
Manar, a television station associated with the Lebanese Shia organization, 
Hezbollah (sometimes spelled Hizballah).70 Hezbollah is a complex 
organization that conducts charitable activities and is a political party within 
Lebanon, but it also uses terrorism to achieve its political goals.71 It has been a 
 
 63 Id. at 36–37 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss Counts 
One Through Three Based on Vagueness and Overbreadth, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO 
(D. Mass. 2011), 2011 WL 3740563). 
 64 See id. at 37 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 63, at 3, 5, 16–18); Abel, supra note 56 at 732–33 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 
His Motion to Dismiss, supra note 63, at 11–12). 
 65 See Abel, supra note 56 at 732–33 (citing Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment Based on Overbreadth and Vagueness at 
21–23, Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011), 2011 WL 3959520).  
 66 Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 38. 
 67 Benjamin Weiser, A Guilty Plea in Providing Satellite TV for Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, 
at A21. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See Timothy Williams & William K. Rashbaum, New York Man Charged with Enabling Hezbollah 
Television Broadcasts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/25/nyregion/25tv.html.  
 71 See Nicholas Kulish, Despite U.S. Fear, Hezbollah Moves Openly in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 
2012, at A1. 
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designated FTO since 1997.72 Eventually, after his First Amendment defense 
was denied by the trial judge on the grounds that Iqbal was being prosecuted 
for conduct, not speech, Iqbal pled guilty to one count of providing material 
support.73 In pleading guilty, Iqbal confessed to receiving money for providing 
services to Al Manar, a fact that the court emphasized in rejecting Iqbal’s First 
Amendment defense.74 Iqbal was sentenced to sixty-nine months in prison.75 
Saleh Elahwal was Iqbal’s business associate.76 He too eventually pled 
guilty to a material-support charge and was sentenced to seventeen months in 
prison.77 
c. Jubair Ahmad 
Jubair Ahmad is a young Pakistani-American (he was twenty-four at the 
time of his conviction) living in Woodbridge, Virginia.78 When he was a 
teenager, before moving to the United States, Ahmad attended a training camp 
run by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), a Pakistani militant group that conducts 
attacks against India because of the ongoing dispute between India and 
Pakistan over the state of Kashmir (LeT is believed to be behind the November 
2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai).79 LeT has been a designated FTO since 
2001.80 In 2010, at the behest of the son of LeT’s leader, Ahmad prepared a 
video glorifying LeT’s activities and calling for fighters to wage jihad.81 He 
then posted the video to YouTube.82 These actions were the sole basis of his 
 
 72 Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Sept. 28, 2012), http:// 
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
 73 See Weiser, supra note 67. 
 74 Id.  
 75 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., New Jersey Man Sentenced to 17 Months in 
Prison for Providing Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (June 23, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/ 
newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo062309.htm.  
 76 See id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Rachel Karas, Woodbridge Man Sentenced to 12 Years for Terrorist Propaganda Video, POST 
LOCAL (Apr. 13, 2012, 6:40 PM ), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/woodbridge-man-
sentenced-to-12-years-for-terrorist-propaganda-video/2012/04/13/gIQACI7tFT_blog.html. 
 79 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Va., Pakistani National Living in Woodbridge Pleads 
Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
vae/news/2011/12/20111202ahmadnr.html; see Karas, supra note 78.  
 80 Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 72.  
 81 See Karas, supra note 78. 
 82 Id. 
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conviction for providing material support to terrorism, resulting in a twelve-
year sentence.83 
2. Material-Support Prosecutions Based on Money 
a. Mohamad Hammoud 
Mohamad Hamomud is a Lebanese citizen who came to the United States 
in 1992.84 While in the United States, he became involved in various illegal 
activities, including cigarette smuggling.85 In addition, he assisted in raising 
money for Hezbollah and himself donated $3,500 to that organization.86 On the 
basis of these actions, Hammoud was tried and convicted of providing material 
support to a terrorist organization (along with a number of other offenses).87 
On appeal, Hammoud argued that his material-support conviction violated 
his First Amendment right to freedom of association.88 The en banc Fourth 
Circuit rejected this view.89 The primary grounds for its ruling was that the 
material-support statute “does not prohibit mere association; it prohibits the 
conduct of providing material support to a designated FTO. Therefore, cases 
regarding mere association with an organization do not control.”90 Because it 
found that the statute did not directly target First Amendment protected 
activity, the court applied the lenient O’Brien test applicable to facially neutral 
statutes that incidentally restrict expressive conduct and easily upheld the 
statute.91 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 
(2005). 
 85 See id. 
 86 Id. at 326. Hammoud’s associates were also found to have provided “dual use” physical equipment to 
Hezbollah, but Hammoud declined to participate in these activities. Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. at 328. 
 89 Id. at 329. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). In O’Brien, the Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction of David Paul O’Brien for burning his draft card during an antiwar rally, on the grounds that the 
statute prohibiting the burning of draft cards was not directed at speech, but was rather a neutral conduct 
regulation whose purpose was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369, 
377. 
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b. Hossein Afshari, Roya Rahmani et al. 
Between 1997 and 2001, a group of individuals, including Hossein Afshari 
and Roya Rahmani, is alleged to have solicited funds at the Los Angeles 
International Airport, purportedly on behalf of an organization named 
“Committee for Human Rights.”92 The collected funds were then allegedly 
forwarded to an organization called Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).93 The MEK is 
an Iranian Marxist group which was designated as an FTO in 1997 (that 
designation was lifted in September of 2012).94 As a consequence, Afshari, 
Rahmani, and their confederates were indicted for violating the material-
support statute.95 The district court dismissed the indictment on the grounds 
that the procedures used to designate MEK as an FTO were unconstitutional.96 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reinstated the indictment.97 In addition to rejecting 
the district court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit also considered, and rejected, a 
First Amendment claim brought by the defendants.98 Specifically, the court 
rejected the argument that the First Amendment protected the defendants’ 
activities by noting that “[t]hough contributions of money given to fund speech 
receive some First Amendment protection, it does not follow that all 
contributions of money are entitled to protection as though they were 
speech.”99 The defendants’ contributions were not entitled to First Amendment 
protections because “[i]n this context, the donation of money could properly be 
viewed by the government as more like the donation of bombs and ammunition 
than speech.”100 The court concluded by quoting its own earlier decision in 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno for the often-stated proposition that 
“[t]here is no First Amendment right to facilitate terrorism.”101 
 
 92 United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 1152–53; Scott Shane, Iranian Dissidents Convince U.S. to Drop Terror Label, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/middleeast/iranian-opposition-group-mek-wins-
removal-from-us-terrorist-list.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 95 Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1152. 
 96 See United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Ashfari 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 97 See Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1153. 
 98 See id. at 1160. 
 99 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976)). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1161 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (2000)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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3. Other Material-Support Prosecutions 
a. The Lackawanna Six 
In the spring of 2001, six Yemeni-American young men from Lackawanna, 
New York, a suburb of Buffalo, traveled to Afghanistan.102 While there, they 
received weapons training at an Al Qaeda training camp, and at least some of 
them met personally with Osama bin Laden.103 They then returned to the 
United States—all prior to the September 11 attacks later that year.104 In the 
year following the attacks, the U.S. government received information about the 
“Lackawanna Six,” which raised concerns that the group might be an Al Qaeda 
“sleeper cell.”105 Eventually, all six men pled to charges of providing material 
support to an FTO based on their training in Afghanistan.106 At no point during 
the trial or investigation of the Lackawanna Six did the government present 
any evidence demonstrating that the group was planning to commit or intended 
to commit a specific act of terrorism.107 The prosecution of the Lackawanna 
Six was hailed by the government as a major victory against terrorism and was 
even mentioned by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union 
address.108 
b. Sami Al-Hussayen 
Sami Al-Hussayen was a Saudi Arabian Ph.D. student in computer science 
at the University of Idaho in Moscow, Idaho.109 He also contributed his time to 
run websites for a number of Islamic charities.110 Although none of the 
charities were themselves FTOs, the prosecution alleged that it was possible to 
link, through the sites run by Al-Hussayen, to other Internet locations where 
users could contribute to FTOs such as Hamas (though Al-Hussayen’s own 
 
 102 For a detailed discussion of the Lackawanna Six prosecution, see Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, 
Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at N1, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/12/nyregion/12LACK.html?pagewanted=1. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id.  
 109 See Maureen O’Hagan, A Terrorism Case That Went Awry, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, http:// 
seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2002097570_sami22m.html. For a detailed description of the Al-Hussayen 
prosecution, see Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material Support to 
Terrorism Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 365, 367–73 (2008). 
 110 See O’Hagan, supra note 109. 
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involvement with these links is disputed).111 As a consequence of these events, 
Al-Hussayen was arrested and charged with material support of terrorism (as 
well as immigration violations).112 After a trial, however, the jury acquitted Al-
Hussayen of all the terrorism-related charges and some of the immigration 
charges (the jury hung on the rest).113 Ultimately, Al-Hussayen agreed to be 
deported in exchange for the remaining charges being dropped.114 
4. Groups Challenging Terrorist Designations 
a. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was an Islamic 
charitable foundation that operated in the United States beginning in 1989.115 It 
described itself as “the largest Muslim charity in the United States.”116 In 
December of 2001, the Holy Land Foundation was designated as a “Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist” and all of its assets were frozen by the 
Department of the Treasury pursuant to an Executive Order issued by President 
Bush following the September 11, 2001 attacks.117 The Executive Order was in 
turn issued under the authority of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act passed by Congress in 1995.118 The primary basis for the Holy 
Land Foundation’s designation was evidence indicating that the Foundation 
“had financial connections to” Hamas and had provided funding to Hamas as 
well as to charitable organizations and individuals linked to Hamas.119 Hamas 
is, of course, the Palestinian group engaged in armed struggle against the 
Israeli occupation of the Occupied Territories.120 Hamas has been designated 
as a Specially Designated Terrorist organization since 1995 and a Specially 
 
 111 Compare Williams, supra note 109, at 368–71 (reciting FBI allegations that Al-Hussayen was 
involved in website development recruiting fighters for jihad), with O’Hagan, supra note 109 (raising doubts 
about Al-Hussayen’s involvement). 
 112 See O’Hagan, supra note 109. 
 113 See id. 
 114 Williams, supra, note 109 at 373. 
 115 See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The 
Foundation was originally named the “Occupied Land Fund” and changed its name to Holy Land Foundation 
in 1991. Id. 
 116 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117 See id.; Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002). 
 118 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006); see 3 C.F.R. 786. 
 119 Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 161. 
 120 See Clyde Haberman, Israeli Tensions Rise as an Officer Is Found Slain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, 
at A1. 
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Designated Global Terrorist organization since 2001121 (it has also been an 
FTO for the purposes of the material-support statute since 1997).122 
The Foundation challenged its designation as a terrorist organization on a 
number of grounds, including a claim that “the government had violated its 
First Amendment rights [including freedom of association] by prohibiting it 
from making any humanitarian contributions by blocking its assets.”123 The 
D.C. Circuit offhandedly rejected this claim, stating that the law is established 
that “there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism.”124 The lower court 
had rejected the Foundation’s First Amendment claims on the same grounds,125 
noting as well that designating the Foundation a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist organization and blocking its assets was permissible because these 
actions “do not prohibit membership in Hamas or endorsement of its views, 
and therefore do not implicate HLF’s associational rights.”126 In the course of 
holding that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional 
right to support terrorists,” the D.C. Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.127 
b. Islamic American Relief Agency 
The Islamic American Relief Agency was, like the Holy Land Foundation, 
an Islamic charity, founded in this case by a Sudanese immigrant in 1985.128 It 
too was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the Bush 
Administration in 2004.129 The factual basis for the Agency’s designation was 
a bit more complicated than with the Holy Land Foundation, but, in short, 
came down to allegations that the Agency had provided funding to another 
entity, which was itself acknowledged to be a terrorist organization.130 Like the 
Holy Land Foundation, the Islamic American Relief Agency raised a freedom 
of association challenge to its designation.131 The D.C. Circuit predictably 
 
 121 Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 159. 
 122 Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 72. 
 123 Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164 (citing FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 
431 (2001)). 
 124 Id. at 164–65 (quoting Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 81 
(D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125 See id. at 164. 
 126 Id. at 161 (quoting Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 Id. at 166 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 128 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 730–31 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 129 See id. at 731. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. 
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rejected this claim on the same grounds as before, citing its decision in Holy 
Land Foundation as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Humanitarian Law 
Project.132 The court went on to reject the argument that the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment case law required proof of a specific intent to advance the 
terrorist organization’s illegal ends, concluding that this requirement was 
limited to instances of pure association, not funding.133 
B. First Amendment Conundrums 
The nine prosecutions described above are, of course, merely a small 
sampling of the hundreds of terrorism-related prosecutions initiated in the 
United States since the September 11 attacks.134 These particular cases were 
selected both because of their prominence and because their facts illustrate 
nicely the complex First Amendment issues that have arisen in the course of 
the War on Terror (albeit, these issues have been treated dismissively by the 
courts). In the next Part, this Article considers how First Amendment rights, 
especially the right of association, interact with terrorism prosecutions and how 
the lower courts’ treatment of these rights comports with previously well-
established First Amendment principles.135 We set the stage for this broader 
discussion by here highlighting some of the issues raised by these particular 
cases. 
Two immediate points jump out from the cases described above. First, in 
none of them (as in Humanitarian Law Project itself) was there any evidence 
that the defendants had knowledge of or actually helped plan, much less 
participated in, a specific act of terror. Thus, despite the sometimes punitive 
sentences imposed on these defendants, none of their prosecutions can be said 
to fall within the uncontroversial core of the government’s anti-terrorism 
efforts. Second, the activities that formed the primary, often exclusive, basis of 
the described prosecutions (except the Lackawanna Six)—running websites, 
posting material on the Internet, distributing television signals, creating and 
posting videos, and providing financial support—are activities that normally 
 
 132 Id. at 736–37 (citing Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 166; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 
1133). 
 133 Id. at 737. 
 134 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Sec. Div., National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed 
International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions (June 6, 2012) (unpublished data chart), http:// 
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/doj060612-stats.pdf (reprinting Department of Justice statistics listing 494 
terrorism-related convictions obtained by the Department between September 2001 and December 2011, the 
most recent being the conviction of Tarek Mehanna). 
 135 See infra Part III. 
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would receive strong First Amendment protections. Despite the lower courts’ 
dismissive treatment, then, the First Amendment issues raised by these 
prosecutions are serious and central to the cases, rather than frivolous and 
peripheral. 
To begin with, these cases illustrate the grave ambiguities created by the 
Supreme Court’s Humanitarian Law Project decision.136 Consider in this 
regard the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s conclusion that the material-
support statute does not violate the First Amendment right of association 
because it does not bar membership,137 combined with the Court’s insistence 
that the statute does not directly regulate speech because it does not prevent 
independent advocacy in support of FTOs.138 But what does “membership” 
mean in this context; what exactly does the statute permit (and prohibit)? Tarek 
Mehanna was prosecuted for providing material support despite the lack of any 
evidence that he had direct contact with an FTO.139 Sami Al-Hussayen was 
charged (albeit acquitted) of material-support charges based on his provision of 
website services to charities that were themselves not FTOs based on possible 
financial links between those charities and an FTO.140 What then is left of 
“independent” advocacy, and concomitantly, what is enough to cross the line 
into coordination? And what exactly does it mean to say that “membership” is 
legal, if speech in support of an FTO, combined with any sort of 
“membership,” no matter how attenuated, crosses the line into material 
support?141 
The Iqbal prosecution raises different, but also serious questions. Iqbal and 
Elahwal, remember, were prosecuted for retransmitting a television signal on 
behalf of an FTO (and in exchange for financial compensation).142 There can 
be no doubt that their actions benefited and supported Hezbollah, of course. 
But that conduct also constituted speech, normally protected by the First 
Amendment.143 The trial judge’s rejection of Iqbal’s First Amendment defense 
 
 136 See supra Part I. 
 137 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
 138 See id. at 2722–23. 
 139 See supra text accompanying notes 54–66. 
 140 See supra text accompanying notes 109–14. 
 141 For a recent judicial discussion of these difficulties, see Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013). For a similar argument that the Court’s reasoning 
leaves little substance to the supposedly preserved right of association, see Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of 
Attorney–Client Association, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1071, 1082. 
 142 See supra text accompanying notes 67–77. 
 143 See Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support for Terrorism, and the 
Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 3 (2011). 
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on the grounds that he was being prosecuted for “conduct” and not speech (in 
part because he was paid to retransmit Al Manar) is difficult to reconcile with 
myriad cases protecting under the First Amendment both the expenditure of 
money to finance speech144 and the republication of another’s speech for 
compensation.145 It is true that Iqbal’s conviction can probably be defended 
under the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny analysis in Humanitarian Law 
Project, but those were not the grounds advanced by the court (the Iqbal 
prosecution predated Humanitarian Law Project). 
Several of the other prosecutions discussed above (including the Holy Land 
Foundation, Islamic American Relief Agency, Hammoud, and Afshari/Rahmani 
cases) together raise yet another issue regarding the scope of First Amendment 
protections in the context of terrorism prosecutions. In all of these cases, the 
sole legal basis for either prosecuting the defendants under the material-
support statute or designating them as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
(with the serious attendant financial consequences) was the fact that the 
individual or entity provided financial support to an FTO.146 Furthermore, in 
each of these cases, the courts rejected a First Amendment defense on the 
grounds that the Constitution does not protect a right to fund terrorism because 
funding is not protected speech or association.147 In this regard, the decisions 
seem consistent with the Supreme Court’s equally cavalier conclusion that the 
material-support statute did not violate freedom of association because it did 
not ban membership, only material support.148 In other words, both the 
Supreme Court and these lower courts simply assumed that money is not 
association. The Hammoud court built on this idea by describing the provision 
of material support as “conduct” and not “association.”149 The difficulty, as we 
shall see in the next Part, is that this statement is flatly inconsistent with 
numerous decisions in other areas of law, raising the question of whether the 
right of association means something different in the terrorism context than 
elsewhere (and if so, why).150 
 
 144 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (holding that the Government may not 
prohibit independent expenditures by corporations used to fund political speech). 
 145 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (“[I]f the allegedly libelous statements 
would otherwise be constitutionally protected . . . , they do not forfeit that protection because they were 
published in the form of a paid advertisement.”). 
 146 See supra Part II.A. 
 147 See supra Part II.A. 
 148 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
 149 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 150 See infra Part III. 
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Finally, we come to the Lackawanna Six. In some ways, this prosecution 
seems the most straightforward of those described above because the actions 
for which the Six were prosecuted—obtaining weapons training from Al 
Qaeda—would not appear to be conduct conceivably protected by the First 
Amendment.151 Indeed, insofar as some of the other prosecutions (notably of 
Ahmad and Mehanna) can be tied to terrorist training, that would appear to 
help avoid First Amendment pitfalls. But in fact, appearances can be deceptive. 
The difficulty is that the material-support statute does not itself prohibit 
obtaining weapons training.152 Of course, the weapons training imparted 
knowledge to the defendants, but § 2339B prohibits individuals from providing 
material support to an FTO, not vice-versa.153 And on the facts of the 
Lackawanna Six litigation, there was a notable absence of proof that the 
defendants’ training had benefited Al Qaeda in any way, given the defendants’ 
failure to plan for or take any overt acts toward acts of violence.154 Seen 
through this lens, there is a strong argument that the Lackawanna Six were 
successfully prosecuted for providing material support simply because they 
associated with (joined?) Al Qaeda, a result in obvious tension with the 
Humanitarian Law Project Court’s saving interpretation of § 2339B as 
permitting simple membership. 
In short, the treatment of the First Amendment in terrorism prosecutions is 
a mess. It is unclear what exactly the line is between protected “independent” 
and illegal “coordinated” advocacy in support of an FTO. It is unclear what 
forms of “pure” association with an FTO are protected and which cross the line 
into material support. And it is unclear why even speech explicitly undertaken 
on behalf of an FTO is unprotected, even though in other contexts such 
political speech is treated as lying at the core of First Amendment protections. 
In the next Part, this Article examines these tensions in a more systematic way 
 
 151 See supra text accompanying notes 102–08. 
 152 There is a separate statute that does prohibit obtaining military training from a terrorist group, but it 
was not enacted until 2004 and so could not be invoked in the Lackawanna Six prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339D (2012). For a complex set of reasons, although this statute was passed in 2004, as of 2009, only a 
single prosecution had been brought under it. See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and 
the Preventive Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 688–89 & n.53 (2009) (citing Criminal Complaint at 
1, United States v. Maldonado, No. 07-cr-124 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2007)). However, there are cases currently 
pending, which charge violations of § 2339D. See, e.g., United States v. Medunjanin, No. 10 CR 019, 2012 
WL 1514766, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012); United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2012 WL 
983545, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
 153 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
 154 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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and places them in the context of modern First Amendment doctrine before 
seeking a path out of this thicket in the last two Parts. 
III.  TERRORISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Article seeks to examine the relationship between terrorism and the 
First Amendment. Until now, it has focused on the facts and legal issues 
associated with a number of terrorism prosecutions. We now turn to the First 
Amendment. What rights does the First Amendment protect that might be 
implicated by the War on Terror? 
As always, it is useful to begin with the text. The First Amendment states 
(leaving aside the Religion Clauses) that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”155 Of these provisions, the Speech and, to a lesser extent, the 
Press Clauses of the First Amendment have received by far the most judicial 
and scholarly attention, so we will start with them. It is, of course, well 
established that the First Amendment generally protects speech unless the 
speech falls within a well-established category of unprotected speech such as 
obscenity or defamation,156 and it is equally well established that within the 
realm of protected speech, speech on the topic of politics or public affairs 
receives the highest level of protection.157 Finally, the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that the First Amendment’s protections for political speech extend 
to all ideas, no matter how distasteful or in opposition to the existing social 
order.158 Under these generous standards, there can be little doubt that most 
speech in support of terrorism constitutes political speech, presumptively 
entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection, and no judge or scholar 
has seriously questioned this conclusion. 
 
 155 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 156 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). But see James Weinstein, Participatory 
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (2011) 
(raising questions about the accuracy of this view). 
 157 See e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) (“Our cases have 
often noted the close connection between our Nation’s commitment to self-government and the rights 
protected by the First Amendment.”); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (explaining that speech 
on public issues has the most protection under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 269–70 (1964) (considering the case before it “against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 158 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)); see also 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled per curiam 
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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The First Amendment’s protections are not, however, absolute. The Court 
has long recognized that incitement—speech that encourages others to engage 
in violence—constitutes unprotected speech that may constitutionally be 
suppressed.159 The modern Court, however, has defined the category of 
incitement extremely narrowly. In its landmark 1969 decision in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, the Court held that speech may be punished as incitement only if it is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”160 In principle (though as we have seen not 
necessarily in practice), speech urging others to engage in acts of terrorism or 
violent jihad should be punishable only if it meets the Brandenburg standard, a 
very high threshold indeed. 
Incitement and Brandenburg, however, are not the focus of this Article 
(though they are not irrelevant either).161 Nor indeed is free speech. Instead, 
this Article focuses on another, equally significant right, which has been given 
short shrift by the courts, the freedom of association, which is rooted not in the 
Speech and Press Clauses but rather in the Assembly Clause of the First 
Amendment. Let us start with text. The First Amendment explicitly protects 
freedom of peaceable assembly as an independent and coequal right to 
freedoms of speech and the press.162 Moreover, as John Inazu has extensively 
documented, throughout most of our history until the mid-twentieth century, 
the freedom of assembly was treated, by courts and the public alike, as an 
extremely significant right, central to the American experience of self-
governance.163 During the first half of the twentieth century, in particular, the 
Supreme Court vigorously asserted and enforced an independent right, which it 
variously denoted as “assembly” and “association,” of citizens to join together 
in both temporary and permanent groups for a variety of purposes, including 
 
 159 For a brief description of the evolution of the incitement doctrine, see Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 1003–
05. 
 160 395 U.S. at 447. 
 161 For a detailed discussion of the undermining of the Brandenburg test in the War on Terror, see 
generally Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009). 
 162 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 163 See INAZU, supra note 47, at 20–62 (providing a historical overview of the freedom of assembly in the 
United States); see also Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 554–61 
(2009) (discussing the relationship between assembly and politics in American history); Bhagwat, supra note 
7, at 984–85 (discussing the treatment of the freedom of assembly by the courts in the first half of the twentieth 
century); Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate 
Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1526, 1550–51 (2004) (highlighting the 
importance of the freedom of assembly); James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular 
Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 330–32, 337–41 (1990) (discussing the 
origin of the freedom of assembly). 
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especially political ones, and also clarified that this right extended to 
“subversive” groups such as the Communist Party.164 Furthermore, cases 
during this period described the right of assembly as “cognate to those of free 
speech and free press and . . . equally fundamental.”165 Beginning with the 
Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,166 
however, the Court gradually abandoned the independent right of 
assembly/association, replacing it with a truncated, nontextual right of 
“expressive association” that protects only the right to associate for speech-
related purposes.167 Indeed, John Inazu notes that the Supreme Court has not 
decided an Assembly Clause case since 1983.168 
Finally, it should be noted that in the modern era, the right of 
assembly/association logically can and should be extended to online forms of 
communication and association (which was the primary form of association at 
issue in several of the prosecutions discussed above, including Tarek 
Mehanna’s).169 As John Inazu has extensively argued, in the Internet age much 
of the associative activities citizens engage in are online, and indeed it is 
becoming more and more difficult to distinguish among physical, distant 
offline, and online forms of assembly and association.170 People’s online and 
offline interactions have come to merge and act in tandem to the point where 
they cannot be untangled. Furthermore, as Inazu argues, online groups and 
communications have played an increasingly central role in political activism 
and self-governance, including most obviously in both of President Obama’s 
presidential campaigns.171 Given the importance of online groups in citizens’ 
lives, the critical role the Internet plays in modern civic activism, and the close 
analogy between the traditional form of physical assembly known to the 
Framers and the nature of modern online forums, there is no logical reason to 
restrict the right of assembly and association to offline conduct. 
 
 164 See Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 983–85 (discussing, among other cases, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 
353 (1937), in which the right to assemble with the Communist Party was protected); David Cole, Hanging 
with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 216 & 
n.39. 
 165 E.g., De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364; accord Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
 166 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 167 The decline of the independent right of assembly/association and the rise of expressive association has 
been extensively recounted elsewhere, and here I aim only to briefly summarize the results of that scholarship. 
See INAZU, supra note 47, at 61–62, 79–84, 132–35, 141–44; Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 985–89.  
 168 See INAZU, supra note 47, at 62. 
 169 See supra Part II.A. 
 170 See John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1094–95 (2013). 
 171 See id. at 1109–10. 
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For all of the Supreme Court’s neglect, an examination of history thus 
leaves no serious doubt that the First Amendment is best read to protect an 
independent right to form groups and otherwise associate, both physically and 
digitally, with fellow citizens for purposes relevant to democratic self-
governance.172 For the purposes of my analysis, I will assume that such an 
independent right of assembly/association exists173 and may be asserted by 
defendants in terrorism prosecutions (though as we will see, to say that the 
right exists does not mean that it is limitless).174 It should be noted, however, 
that much of the discussion that follows would not be significantly altered if 
the freedom of association is limited, as the modern Supreme Court seems to 
assume, to expressive association. This is because almost all FTOs are highly 
expressive in that their purpose is to advance and propagate a political and/or 
religious ideology, and one of the primary means they employ to do so is 
through speech. This statement is true of Hezbollah, Hamas, the PKK, the 
Tamil Tigers, the LeT, and indeed Al Qaeda itself—as illustrated by the large 
percentage of terrorism prosecutions that ultimately rest on speech. This is not 
to say that these organizations are exclusively or even primarily expressive—
but neither obviously are the Boy Scouts, yet the Supreme Court has accorded 
full expressive association rights to that group.175 If, as I argue, the freedom of 
association is a stand-alone right, then a fortiori it would seem to extend to 
citizens seeking to associate with FTOs. And if it is limited to expressive 
association, nevertheless the mixed expressive/non-expressive nature of FTOs 
is not reason enough to deny individuals the right to associate with them. If 
FTOs’ associational rights can be restricted, it must be on some other ground. 
Now we may return to terrorism and its relationship to the right of 
association. Our starting point must be that invoking the word “terrorism” 
cannot end all analysis, any more than the word “Communism” should have in 
an earlier era. Indeed, in Humanitarian Law Project the Supreme Court 
appeared to acknowledge this point by interpreting the material-support statute 
to not bar simple membership in FTOs, implying that it could not do so 
 
 172 For a further defense of this principle, see Cole, supra note 164, at 226–29.  
 173 I will henceforth describe the right as “freedom of association” because that is the dominant modern 
nomenclature. There is some historical support for the proposition that the term “assembly” contained in the 
constitutional text protected temporary gatherings, while the term “association” referred to more permanent 
groups, whose constitutional status was a bit less clear. See Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 639, 742–43 (2002). However, as the discussion in the text indicates, throughout most of our 
history the public and the courts used the terms assembly and association interchangeably and clearly 
presumed constitutional protection for permanent groups. 
 174 See infra Part IV. 
 175 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000). 
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constitutionally.176 In fact, however, the actual contours of the Humanitarian 
Law Project analysis, in combination with lower court decisions such as those 
recounted above in Part II,177 have left very little substance to this concession, 
in the process eviscerating the right of association itself. Freedom of 
association means that individuals may not be prosecuted for membership in 
FTOs. But what, in this context, does “membership” mean? It would appear 
that the answer is “almost nothing.” As Wadie Said and David Cole point out, 
the membership protected by Humanitarian Law Project is entirely hollow—it 
does not permit any acts on behalf of an FTO because that would constitute 
providing “personnel” in violation of § 2339B, nor does it even permit the 
payment of membership fees to an FTO because that would constitute material 
support in the form of funds.178 
This point is further illustrated by the prosecution of the Lackawanna Six. 
Recall that in that case, the defendants were found guilty of providing material 
support to Al Qaeda on the basis of their attending an Al Qaeda training camp, 
where they received weapons training, and meeting with Osama bin Laden (all 
before the September 11, 2001, attacks).179 Given the fact, noted earlier, that 
the government failed to prove any benefit that the Six provided to Al 
Qaeda,180 the implication of this case seems clear: joining an FTO, meeting 
with its leaders, and taking actions suggesting support for the organization’s 
goals alone is sufficient to violate the material-support statute. But if this alone 
crosses the line, what exactly is the “membership” that the Humanitarian Law 
Project Court claimed remains protected conduct? In short, whatever the 
Supreme Court said in Humanitarian Law Project, in practice the right of 
membership in an FTO is wholly fictitious because any individual foolish 
enough to invoke it is likely to be found in violation of § 2339B.181 
The muddle increases when one considers Tarek Mehanna’s case. The 
government argued that Mehanna’s speech, with no accompanying conduct, 
violated the material-support statute because it was sufficiently coordinated 
 
 176 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). 
 177 See supra Part II. 
 178 See Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1507 & n.241 (citing David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the 
Paradigm of Prevention in the “War on Terror,” in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 242 
(Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008)). The Holy Land Foundation and Hammoud cases, discussed 
earlier, illustrate this point nicely. See supra Part II.A. 
 179 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 180 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 181 For a similar argument, see Cole, supra note 164, at 247–48. 
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with Al Qaeda.182 But as noted earlier, that claim of coordination was not 
based on any strong evidence of ongoing dialogue between Mehanna and Al 
Qaeda leaders, but rather based on Mehanna’s stated belief that he was acting 
as a “wing” of Al Qaeda.183 There are two puzzles here. First, the trial judge’s 
rejection of Mehanna’s First Amendment defense reveals an extremely odd 
implication of Humanitarian Law Project when we juxtapose two separate 
holdings in the latter case. In analyzing the free speech claim in Humanitarian 
Law Project, the Court concluded that the material-support statute was not a 
flat ban on political speech because it condemned only speech “to, under the 
direction of, or in coordination with” an FTO, not independent advocacy.184 
But in rejecting the association claim, the Court held that membership in an 
FTO alone is protected conduct.185 Presumably, however, active membership 
in an FTO would be sufficient to establish coordination, especially given the 
prosecution in Mehanna based on coordination with an FTO despite minimal 
contact between Mehanna and Al Qaeda members.186 Put Humanitarian Law 
Project and Mehanna together and under current law, one may join an FTO, 
and one may speak in favor of an FTO, but not both. This is bizarre. After all, 
what is the point of membership in a group one cannot speak in support of? 
Indeed, is it not the whole point of the Court’s “expressive association” 
jurisprudence that speech engaged in through associations is especially favored 
constitutionally? More broadly, there is a strong argument to be made that, for 
reasons both historical and theoretical, when the political rights protected by 
the First Amendment, such as speech and association, are exercised in tandem, 
they deserve special solicitude.187 It should be noted in this regard that the 
original drafts of the Assembly Clause, including James Madison’s original 
proposal to Congress,188 the proposals that emerged from state ratifying 
conventions,189 and the version in George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of 
Rights that provided the basis for those proposals,190 all described a right of the 
 
 182 See Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 38. As noted earlier, in affirming Mehanna’s conviction, the First 
Circuit abandoned this theory, almost conceding its legal insufficiency. See supra note 58. 
 183 See Abel, supra note 56, at 732 (citing Government’s Proffer and Memorandum in Support of 
Detention, supra note 56, at 11). 
 184 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722–23 (2010). 
 185 See id. at 2730. 
 186 See Pyetranker, supra note 54, at 38. 
 187 This argument is laid out in detail in Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 995–1002. 
 188 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 129 (Neil H. Cogan 
ed., 1997). 
 189 Id. at 140. 
 190 George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, CONSTITUTION.ORG., http://www.constitution.org/ 
gmason/amd_gmas.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2012). 
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people “peaceably to assemble together and consult for their common good” or 
a very close approximation. This right was also inevitably linked to the right to 
petition the legislature for a redress of grievances.191 In other words, the right 
of assembly was a right to gather together with fellow citizens, to speak 
together, and to speak in unison to those in power.192 By effectively banning all 
speech in the context of membership, Humanitarian Law Project and Mehanna 
appear to stand these principles on their head. 
A second, even more significant implication of the government’s theory in 
the Mehanna case is that just as the right of association (through membership) 
that the Humanitarian Law Project Court claimed was not barred by the 
material-support statute turns out to be wholly illusory, so too does the right of 
independent advocacy on behalf of an FTO. The roots of the problem lie in 
Humanitarian Law Project itself. While, as noted above, the Humanitarian 
Law Project majority held that the material-support statute did not bar 
independent advocacy, in just the previous section of the opinion the Court had 
refused to provide any guidance whatsoever on what forms of communication 
or conduct might cross the line into coordination.193 Building on this lack of 
clarity, in the Mehanna case, as noted above, coordination was alleged and 
allowed to go to the jury based on the defendant’s actions alone, taken in 
response to a general plea from an FTO.194 This suggests that 
coordination/membership can be unilateral, which is certainly a rather unusual 
view of what association means. But more fundamentally, it makes the safe 
harbor of independent advocacy very dangerous indeed, because the 
supposedly protected speech itself can become proof of coordination. What 
confidence could any speaker have, then, that speech in favor of an FTO will 
not result in a successful prosecution? 
Perhaps the underlying theory behind the Mehanna prosecution and the 
trial court’s approach was that speech such as Mehanna’s, which actively 
sought to recruit individuals to perform violent acts on behalf of Al Qaeda, 
crosses the line between protected abstract advocacy and unprotected 
incitement. This, however, makes a shambles of long-established principles of 
free speech law. How, for example, can this approach be reconciled with 
Justice Holmes’s memorable comment in his Gitlow dissent that “[e]very idea 
 
 191 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 188, 
at 129, 140; George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, supra note 190. 
 192 See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 573–77 (2010). 
 193 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2010). 
 194 See Abel, supra note 56, at 732. 
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is an incitement,”195 the very point of which was to reject a distinction between 
abstract advocacy and incitement, insisting instead on proof of actual and 
imminent harm? More fundamentally, this attempted distinction simply cannot 
be reconciled with Brandenburg, the foundational case in this area (and the 
direct heir to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Gitlow), which insists that the First 
Amendment does “not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use 
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”196 The Mehanna prosecution did not appear to make any effort to 
prove that Mehanna’s website posed a threat of inciting imminent and likely 
violence, after all.197 Instead, the government (successfully) sought to avoid 
Brandenburg altogether by recasting Mehanna’s actions as “coordination” and 
“material support.”198 Such an approach could just as easily have been used to 
justify the now-discredited anticommunist prosecutions of the first and second 
Red Scares.199 In short, the Mehanna trial court’s understanding of the 
Humanitarian Law Project decision threatens to undermine a well-settled line 
of precedent that historically and logically lies at the heart of free speech law. 
Nor is Mehanna the only post–September 11 terrorism prosecution in 
tension with Brandenburg. Jubair Ahmad’s conviction was much like 
Mehanna’s in that, at heart, it was based on speech seeking to incite violent 
action, but there was no proof, or even hint, of likely and imminent violence in 
response to Ahmad’s speech.200 Admittedly, in the Ahmad prosecution the 
proof of coordination with an FTO was much stronger than with Mehanna 
because Ahmad acted at the instigation and under the direction of an LeT 
leader.201 But the “material support” he provided to LeT consisted of nothing 
more than inciting speech. In effect, under the theory of prosecutions such as 
Ahmad’s, the Brandenburg test applies only to purely unilateral speech, not 
speech in coordination with an FTO, making speech plus association a crime 
where neither, alone, could be prosecuted. 
 
 195 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Gitlow dissent, arising 
out of the anticommunist prosecutions of the first Red Scare, is, of course, one of the foundational opinions of 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 
 196 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 197 See Abel, supra note 56, at 732. 
 198 See id. at 732–33. 
 199 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497–98, 509–11 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 363–64, 371–72 (1927), overruled per curiam by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 
655–56, 664–67; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617, 624 (1919). 
 200 See Karas, supra note 78. 
 201 See id. 
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Brandenburg and the law of incitement, victims though they are of the War 
on Terror,202 are not, however, the primary focus of this Article; the focus is, 
rather, association. As discussed earlier, while the Supreme Court in 
Humanitarian Law Project purported to preserve a right to association with 
FTOs through “membership,” terrorism prosecutions in the lower courts (and 
for that matter, Humanitarian Law Project itself) have narrowed this right to 
the point of meaninglessness.203 But this is not the only way in which terrorism 
prosecutions conflict with, and so undermine, decisions protecting the right of 
association. Consider in this regard the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s 
argument that one of the reasons Congress could constitutionally ban even the 
provision of nonviolent material support to FTOs is that such support can “lend 
legitimacy” to those organizations, and so facilitate their illegal ends.204 As 
Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, this justification cannot really distinguish 
independent from coordinated advocacy in favor of an FTO, because either 
form of speech can act to “legitimate” an FTO.205 More fundamentally, this 
reasoning also cannot be reconciled with the majority’s understanding that 
§ 2339B does not forbid membership in an FTO.206 After all, the choice of an 
individual not otherwise linked to illegal activity to join an FTO surely lends 
substantial legitimacy to the organization. Indeed, this theory of legitimation 
provided one of the primary motivations for the infamous prosecution of Anita 
Whitney for membership in the Communist Party during the first Red Scare,207 
a prosecution and theory that was sharply criticized by Justice Brandeis in one 
of the most influential First Amendment opinions in the history of the Supreme 
Court.208 Moreover, as Justice Breyer also points out, the Humanitarian Law 
Project majority’s legitimacy argument simply cannot be reconciled with 
other, foundational right of association cases which uphold the right to join the 
Communist Party so long as one did not intend to further its violent ends, 
 
 202 See Healy, supra note 161, at 655; supra text accompanying note 161. 
 203 See supra Parts I.B, II.A. 
 204 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010). 
 205 See id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 206 See id. at 2730 (majority opinion). 
 207 See Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 407, 411–12 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
 208 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), overruled 
per curiam by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Bhagwat, supra note 207, at 407 (quoting Vincent 
Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988)). 
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because such membership surely conferred legitimacy.209 Once again, 
therefore, the judicial reasoning in terrorism cases is found to be in seemingly 
irreconcilable conflict with extant First Amendment jurisprudence, a conflict 
that courts do not even acknowledge, much less seek to reconcile.210 
Finally, yet another conflict between the analysis of association rights in 
terrorism cases and broad First Amendment doctrine concerns the treatment of 
financial contributions. The starting point here is to recognize that a large 
fraction of the terrorism cases discussed earlier, including Holy Land 
Foundation, Islamic American Relief Agency, Hammoud, and Afshari, were 
based exclusively on the contribution of money to an FTO.211 In response to 
claims that such punishment violated rights of association, the standard judicial 
response has been that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other 
constitutional right to support terrorists.”212 Alternatively, the Hammoud court 
dismissed First Amendment concerns because the material-support statute 
“does not prohibit mere association; it prohibits the conduct of providing 
material support to a designated FTO,”213 and similarly in Afshari, the court 
concluded that the donations at issue were “more like the donation of bombs 
and ammunition than speech.”214 Moreover, these statements seem to follow 
the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s own reasoning in rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ association claim on the grounds that the material-support statute 
does not forbid membership in an FTO, and so does not penalize “simple 
association or assembly,”215 clearly implying that the provision of material 
support, including financial support, is not “mere association.” 
The problem is how to reconcile this reasoning with statements by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts in other contexts, notably campaign finance 
 
 209 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605–10 
(1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1961); De 
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)). 
 210 The Humanitarian Law Project majority’s only effort to respond to Justice Breyer’s argument was a 
cryptic footnote stating (without explanation) that because § 2339B does not ban “pure speech and 
association,” without more, reliance on the Communist Party cases is “unfounded.” Id. at 2723 n.4 (majority 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211 See supra Part II.A. 
 212 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003); accord Islamic 
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 736–37 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 
205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 213 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 
(2005). 
 214 United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 215 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730. 
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reform, that financial contributions are a form of association protected by the 
First Amendment.216 Indeed, the presumption that financial contributions are a 
form of protected association forms the bedrock of an entire line of Supreme 
Court decisions, starting with the seminal decision in this area, Buckley v. 
Valeo,217 that subject laws limiting financial contribution to political 
candidates to close First Amendment scrutiny.218 Why should it be that a 
contribution to a political candidate or political action group constitutes 
protected association, while a similar contribution to an FTO is entirely 
unprotected? The only hint of a judicial answer, raised in passing by the 
Hammoud court, is that the right of association is limited to expressive 
associations, and FTOs do not qualify.219 This, however, is most unconvincing. 
First of all, as noted earlier, the flat assertion that FTOs are not expressive 
seems incomprehensible in light of the extensive political and expressive 
activities of most FTOs, including most especially Hezbollah (the FTO at issue 
in Hammoud).220 After all, Iqbal was prosecuted for rebroadcasting 
Hezbollah’s television station!221 More broadly, however, for reasons 
discussed earlier,222 it seems incorrect as a matter of history, text, and theory to 
limit the right of association to expressive associations. Instead, the Assembly 
Clause of the First Amendment is best understood to protect a free-standing 
right to associate with organizations whose activities and expression are 
relevant to the political process.223 Under that broad definition, at first cut 
FTOs surely qualify for protection because they are surely political.224 Once 
the expressive/nonexpressive distinction is rejected, therefore, the terrorism 
 
 216 See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001) (“Spending for 
political ends and contributing to political candidates both fall within the First Amendment’s protection of 
speech and political association.”); Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 
152 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Colo. Republican, 533 U.S. at 440); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 n.7 (2008)); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636 
(8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)); Casino Ass’n of La. v. State, 2002-0265, 
p. 8 (La. 6/21/02); 820 So. 2d 494, 500. 
 217 424 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity 
restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties.”). 
 218 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006); Colo. Republican, 533 U.S. at 440; Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000). 
 219 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 328 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 
(2005) (“Hammoud relies in part on cases holding that a donation to a political advocacy group is a proxy for 
speech. Hizballah is not a political advocacy group, however.” (citation omitted)). 
 220 See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text. 
 221 See Weiser, supra note 67. 
 222 See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 223 See Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 990–94. 
 224 Though, as is discussed in more detail in the next Part, there are alternative grounds upon which 
exclusion of FTOs from First Amendment protections might be grounded. 
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cases simply cannot be reconciled with the scope of freedom of association in 
other contexts. 
Why does all of this matter? After all, surely the First Amendment does not 
prohibit the U.S. government from stopping its citizens from providing funds 
or other tangible aid to terrorist organizations, which can be used to attack U.S. 
citizens? Indeed, is it really plausible or realistic to expect the government to 
take no action against acknowledged members of FTOs until an attack is 
“imminent” and “likely”? Probably not. The problem is that the judiciary’s 
current failure to acknowledge or grapple with these contradictions at all 
undermines the rule of law. This is itself a dangerous tactic in a conflict that 
turns so much on convincing the hearts and minds of potential adversaries. But 
in addition, broad judicial statements dismissing seemingly substantial First 
Amendment concerns as frivolous threaten to undermine First Amendment 
rights—including, in particular, associational rights—in other contexts by 
providing language that “lies about like a loaded weapon” and can be drawn 
upon by future litigants and courts.225 Given the central role that First 
Amendment liberties play in the maintenance of our system of democratic 
government, this seems a grave risk. Better, surely, to tackle these problems 
directly and develop a coherent framework within which to reconcile widely 
held instincts regarding appropriate limits on activities that aid terrorism with 
the words and law of the First Amendment. It is to that task that we now turn. 
IV.  PEACEABLE ASSOCIATION 
One clear and abiding lesson emerging from the previous discussion is that, 
in the course of upholding the criminal prosecutions that lie at the heart of the 
domestic War on Terror, courts are systematically ignoring long-standing First 
Amendment principles, and in particular, are tearing apart established 
definitions of the right of assembly and association. The watered-down 
associational right that emerges from the terrorism cases, a right that 
theoretically permits membership in an FTO (though as we noted, even that is 
doubtful), but clearly precludes combining membership with communications 
with an FTO, speech on behalf of an FTO, or any financial contribution to an 
FTO, has no relation to the robust right to freedom of association protected 
throughout most of our history. Even the truncated right of “expressive 
association” protected by the modern Court has been understood to protect a 
 
 225 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial 
statements sanctioning a racially discriminatory order could be used for harmful ends in future proceedings). 
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more robust form of membership than the terrorism cases acknowledge.226 But 
when one takes into account the broad, free-standing right of association, 
rooted in the Assembly Clause, that has been recognized throughout most of 
our history, the damage is even more clear. For example, there seems to be 
little doubt that such a right of association must protect a right to pool financial 
resources—i.e., for individuals to contribute to associations—or the right 
would have little meaning because for associations to either speak or act, 
typically they must expend funds. The bland dismissal in the terrorism cases of 
a “right to support terrorists” seems irreconcilable with this fact and the history 
that lies behind it.227 At the same time, it does seem intuitively unlikely that the 
Constitution protects a right to provide Al Qaeda with funds that the 
organization can use to purchase explosives—after all, the Constitution is not a 
“suicide pact.”228 Some coherent, legal principle must be found permitting 
reasonable steps to combat terrorism without eviscerating the Assembly 
Clause. 
It is the contention of this Article that a solution is in fact possible. Instead 
of narrowing the definition of the sorts of actions that constitute association, as 
courts have done in terrorism cases,229 we should instead consider carefully 
what kinds of associations may claim the protections of the First Amendment. 
The beginnings of an answer can be found in the roots of the associational 
right. In particular, as discussed earlier, in the past thirty years the Court has 
entirely forgotten the Assembly Clause and the fact that the freedom of 
association is rooted directly in that constitutional text.230 If one does turn to 
the text of the Assembly Clause, however, there emerges an immediate 
limiting principle: the Assembly Clause does not protect all assemblies but 
only “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”231 The right was 
conceived as one of citizens to gather together and consult on public issues but 
 
 226 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (protecting an individual’s right to associate 
with a political candidate by providing financial contributions); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 
(1963) (protecting an association’s right to provide legal representation to members); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 485–86, 490 (1960) (protecting an individual’s right not to disclose associational ties); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (protecting an association’s right to maintain its 
members’ anonymity). 
 227 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 228 Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is a danger that, if 
the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional 
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). 
 229 See supra Part II.A. 
 230 See INAZU, supra note 47, at 62.  
 231 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
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was never a right to riot. Furthermore, given the democracy-enhancing goals of 
the First Amendment, this restriction makes perfect sense because violence per 
se has no proper role in the democratic process (though as we shall discuss, 
abstract advocacy of violence may be different232). Indeed, in the brief 
legislative history of the Assembly Clause in the 1st Congress, there is an 
express mention of the “abuse” of the right of Assembly during the 1786 
Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts (though the speaker, Elbridge Gerry, 
insisted that this was no reason to withhold a right of peaceable assembly).233 
The Supreme Court, in one of its seminal Assembly Clause decisions, 
described the purpose of the Assembly Clause as being to ensure “that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if 
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.”234 Thus, both the text and the 
historical understandings of the Assembly Clause limit its protections to 
peaceful gatherings. 
If this restriction applies to assemblies, it must logically apply to 
associations (which indeed might simply be thought of as permanent 
assemblies).235 After all, the underlying purpose of the rights of temporary 
assembly and permanent association is the same—to enable citizen 
participation in governing.236 But that participation must be peaceful. Even the 
insurrectionary right of assembling in convention that Akhil Amar defends is a 
right of the collective people to change their government peacefully, not to 
engage in armed rebellion.237 Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville himself (and 
others after him) argued that one of the benefits of protecting a right of 
association is that it provides a social “safety valve,” preventing disaffected 
citizens from going underground and resorting to violence by allowing them a 
means to jointly engage in the democratic process.238 Such an understanding is 
entirely inconsistent with protecting a right of association with groups engaged 
in, or explicitly planning for, violence. The textually rooted right of association 
 
 232 See infra text accompanying notes 255, 289–94. 
 233 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 188, 
at 144 (referencing the speech of Elbridge Gerry). 
 234 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); see also Mark Tushnet, The Hughes Court and Radical 
Political Dissent: The Cases of Dirk De Jonge and Angelo Herndon, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 333, 358 (2012) 
(quoting De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 365). 
 235 See supra note 173; see also INAZU, supra note 47, at 166–67. 
 236 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 237 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 28, 30 (1998). 
 238 See Cole, supra note 164, 231–32 (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 202–
03 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1948)); cf. George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 
37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (arguing that the act of associating is valuable in and of itself). 
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is one of peaceable association and may properly be denied to groups outside 
that definition. 
Moreover, the restriction to peaceable assemblies does not exclude only 
violence to persons; it also excludes violence to property. There can be no 
doubt that the Framers would have considered a riot aimed at private property 
no more protected than a riot seeking to harm individuals, just as today no 
reasonable person would protect a constitutional right to destroy, for example, 
a McDonald’s. This principle, however, has important implications for modern 
technology and, in particular, for the problem of cyberterrorism. In recent 
years, associations whose purpose and practice is to launch cyberattacks on 
ideologically disfavored websites have emerged. The most famous example of 
such an organization is the hackers group Anonymous,239 though the Islamic 
group Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters has also garnered attention 
recently.240 The obvious question that arises is whether such groups are 
protected by the right of peaceable assembly and association. The answer, I 
would stipulate, is fairly clearly “no.” Destruction of property takes many 
forms, and while in the Framers’ day the focus would, for obvious reasons, 
have been on physical destruction, destruction of websites and other digital 
property through cyber attacks is sufficiently analogous to physical attacks to 
warrant denial of the term “peaceable” to such conduct. In both cases, one is 
dealing with behavior that is clearly illegal and that effectively destroys an 
owner’s use of property. In a world where a vast and growing amount of 
property is in fact purely digital, treating destruction of such property as 
analogous to destruction of physical property is both logical and necessary.241 
Difficult boundary questions of course remain. For example, there is an 
argument to be made for extending the concept of violence to property to 
conduct, such as larceny and embezzlement, which though literally peaceful, 
has the practical effect of denying the owner his or her property. Indeed, it is 
tempting to extend the exclusion to all groups that interfere with property 
 
 239 See Anonymous (Internet Group), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
organizations/a/anonymous_internet_group/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).  
 240 See Jeb Boone, Who Are the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters?, GLOBALPOST (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/the-grid/who-are-the-izz-ad-din-al-qassam-cyber-
fighters; Tracy Kitten, DDoS Attacks on Banks Resume, BANK INFO SECURITY (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www. 
bankinfosecurity.com/ddos-attacks-on-banks-resume-a-5541.  
 241 This is not to say that a simple act of patent or copyright infringement would suffice to eliminate a 
group’s constitutional protections. The notion that such intellectual property qualifies as “property” for these 
purposes or that simple infringement qualifies as destruction of property seems highly dubious, though the 
topic is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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rights, or even engage in illegal activities, on the theory that such groups play 
no proper part in the democratic process. This further step, however, would be 
unjustified and dangerous because such expansions of the range of groups 
excluded from the definition of “peaceable” assemblies and associations could 
easily eviscerate the underlying right. The impact of such an expansion, for 
example, would be to deny constitutional protection to any protest group that 
regularly engages in civil disobedience because such disobedience is by 
definition illegal, and it generally interferes with property rights (consider 
lunch counter sit-ins). It would also permit hostile governments to single out 
unpopular groups for suppression based on inadvertent or exaggerated 
violations of minor laws. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that even if the 
First Amendment protects association with a group that violates the law in 
nonviolent ways, it does not protect the underlying illegal conduct. Associating 
with a group that engages in trespass may not be subject to punishment, but 
trespass remains so. 
The insight that the Assembly Clause and association right do not protect 
all groups equally seems to be largely missing from current jurisprudence. To 
be fair, the Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project made a gesture in this 
direction. In setting out the limits of its reasoning in upholding the material-
support statute, the Court stated that it did “not suggest that Congress could 
extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic 
organizations.”242 Perhaps that is the better path out of this conundrum—a rule 
restricting the associational right to domestic groups, which would permit 
prosecution for association with foreign entities, rather than my proposed 
restriction to peaceable groups. After all, FTOs are by definition foreign, and 
so such a rule would cabin the key terrorism cases without threatening 
domestic liberties. Moreover, there is precedent supporting the proposition that 
the protections of the Bill of Rights do not extend to foreigners outside the 
territory of the United States,243 lending further support to this thesis. 
 
 242 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
 243 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a 
foreign country); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that “the jurisdiction of the 
courts to afford the right to habeas relief and the protection of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens 
held in Executive detention in the Bagram detention facility in the Afghan theater of war”); Kiyemba v. 
Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 131 (2010) (noting that the “due process 
clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States”); 
United States v. Vilches-Navarette, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply when the United States acts against aliens in international waters). 
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Ultimately, however, the restriction the Humanitarian Law Project 
majority points toward is unsatisfying. To understand why, it is useful to go 
back to first principles and consider why the First Amendment protects 
associational freedom (or for that matter, speech, the press, and petitioning as 
well). There exists an extensive body of scholarship demonstrating the close, 
historical links between the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and 
petitioning, and the practice of democratic self-governance.244 Indeed, the 
significance of the associational right in the United States and its close link to 
our system of democracy has been recognized by observers since de 
Tocqueville published Democracy in America.245 The Supreme Court has 
similarly been quite explicit in tying the right of association to democratic 
politics.246 This is not necessarily to say that the only function of First 
Amendment liberties, including freedom of association, is to further self-
governance; but there can be little doubt that this is their primary function. 
At first cut, the close connection between association and self-governance 
would seem to support the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s distinction 
between domestic and foreign groups. After all, democracy is about self-
governance, and in this case “self” means the sovereign people of the United 
States, not foreigners outside of this country.247 FTOs such as Hamas or Al 
Qaeda surely have no legitimate role to play in our system of democracy. 
Ultimately, however, this argument goes too far. While it seems relatively 
clear that purely foreign organizations, whether FTOs or otherwise, have no 
claim to associational rights under the First Amendment, the terrorism cases do 
not involve that situation—they involve attempts by U.S. citizens and residents 
to associate with foreign groups.248 Perhaps at the time of the Constitution’s 
framing, such associations would have had limited relevance to democratic 
politics, but in the globalized world in which we live, a world in which the 
 
 244 See, e.g., Abu El-Haj, supra note 163, at 547, 554–55, 586–89; Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 991–93; 
Inazu, supra note 192, at 571–77; Mazzone, supra note 173, at 647, 729–30; see also AMAR, supra note 237, 
at 28–30 (arguing that the Assembly Clause protects a right of the sovereign people to assemble in convention 
and change their government). 
 245 See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1840). 
 246 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56, 57 (1973)); 
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975). 
 247 I leave aside the more difficult question of foreign citizens residing in the United States. For an 
argument that self-governance principles support extending the protections of the Bill of Rights to this group, 
see ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
264–66 (2010). 
 248 See supra Part II.A. 
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United States is the dominant international power and has an almost infinite 
variety of commitments and ties abroad, this position is implausible. Surely, as 
part of their roles as active citizen–participants in our system of government, 
U.S. citizens must have a protected right to associate and consult with foreign 
groups such as Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, Greenpeace, 
Oxfam, and for that matter, the Communist Internationale (in its time). To 
restrict the associational right to purely domestic groups would be crippling to 
U.S. citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in debating and influencing 
American policy, a result which cannot be reconciled with the purposes of the 
First Amendment—which is no doubt why the Supreme Court’s own cases 
recognize the right of a U.S. citizen to receive communications (in particular, 
communist propaganda communications) from abroad.249 
The problem with the distinction between foreign and domestic groups 
drawn by the Humanitarian Law Project Court, the error in its analysis, is that 
the Court’s reasoning is rooted in neither the text nor the purposes of the First 
Amendment. One suspects the reason for this is that the Court, in its modern 
embrace of the ahistorical right of “expressive association,” has lost track of 
the Assembly Clause. To reiterate, however, when one does look at the text of 
that provision, it becomes clear that the Constitution simply does not protect 
any right to assemble, or associate, with organizations whose primary activities 
and goals are violent. It should be noted that to lose constitutional protection, it 
must be the group that is violent; it is not enough that some members of the 
group engage in violence.250 But violent groups are simply out of the First 
Amendment. And this remains true no matter how ideological or political the 
group’s motivations happen to be. Al Qaeda is not a peaceable association, any 
more than the Mafia, and there is therefore no right to associate with it.251 
Importantly, moreover, this reasoning applies fully to domestic associations, 
 
 249 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965); see also Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 
U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (striking down, on right-to-travel grounds, a statute denying passports to all members of 
registered Communist organizations). 
 250 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (“Civil liability may not be 
imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of 
violence.”). 
 251 I do not consider here (because they are beyond the scope of this Article) the difficult questions of 
proof that arise in implementing this restriction, including in particular the extent to which entities may be 
designated as violent through an administrative process to which the courts then defer in subsequent legal 
proceedings. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 
1097 (2005); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162–63 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For a 
description and critique of the administrative process for designating FTOs, see Sahar F. Aziz, Note, The Laws 
on Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a 
Legitimate Tool for Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 45, 91–92 (2003). 
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no less than foreign ones. This is an important point because terrorism is not, 
of course, a wholly foreign phenomenon (nor is it, obviously, an exclusively 
Islamic one). The material-support statute targets foreign terrorist 
organizations only,252 but its companion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, is not so 
limited,253 and the broader social interest in preventing terrorism encompasses 
wholly domestic terrorism no less than terrorism inspired from abroad. After 
all, aside from the September 11 attacks, the most deadly terrorist attack on 
U.S. soil was a purely domestic event: the bombing of the Oklahoma City 
federal office building on April 19, 1995, by Timothy McVeigh.254 Because 
the exclusion of non-peaceable associations from First Amendment protections 
does not turn on the ideological character of the group, it means that no 
constitutional protection is due to any predominantly violent domestic 
organizations, whether they be right-wing militias, radical animal-rights 
groups, or wholly domestic jihadi groups. Al Qaeda is merely a special case 
illustrating this general principle. 
It is important to note that under this reasoning, what becomes unprotected 
is the act of associating with a violent group. The exclusion of violent groups 
discussed above has no application to the freedom of speech, since the Free 
Speech Clause does not limit its protections to “peaceable” speech. What this 
means is that, as the Humanitarian Law Project Court says, purely independent 
advocacy, even of terrorism, may not be punished unless the Brandenburg 
standard can be met.255 But association with violent groups may be punished 
regardless of whether it is accompanied by speech. Furthermore, one’s speech 
may be used as evidence of such association, just as speech, such as 
confessions, may be used as evidence of any other crime. Of course, speech 
alone, even speech supportive of an organization, cannot in itself be equated 
with association or the free speech right would be eviscerated. But nor does 
such speech immunize otherwise unprotected association. The key is whether 
an individual has joined or is otherwise working together, in coordination, with 
a violent group. If the answer is no, the individual’s speech is protected, 
subject to the Brandenburg test; but if the answer is yes, the individual may be 
prosecuted without more. 
 
 252 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 253 See id. § 2339A. 
 254 See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding conviction of bomber 
Timothy McVeigh). 
 255 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2733 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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One important implication of this analysis is that because the distinction 
between independent and coordinated speech (or for that matter conduct) 
becomes central to defining the scope of constitutional protections, it is 
essential to clearly define that line. As described earlier, the Supreme Court in 
Humanitarian Law Project was notably unhelpful on this point;256 nor have the 
lower courts provided much clarity in terrorism cases.257 There is, however, 
another area of law that implicates associational rights and where the 
independent/coordinated line is critical, and so might provide some guidance in 
terrorism cases. This is in the area of campaign finance reform. Under current 
law, individuals (including political candidates) and corporations have an 
essentially unlimited First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of 
money to fund independent speech on political topics, including supporting or 
opposing political candidates.258 In contrast, when expenditure for speech is 
made in coordination with a political candidate, it is treated as a contribution 
rather than an independent expenditure and as such is subject to greater 
regulation.259 Thus the distinction between independent and coordinated 
actions is central to the enforcement of campaign finance regulations, and 
courts have developed an extensive jurisprudence on the subject.260 Moreover, 
in 2007, the Federal Election Commission enacted a regulation setting forth a 
complex and detailed multifactor test for identifying coordinated 
expenditures.261 Admittedly, the courts have not developed any crystal-clear 
rules regarding when communication crosses the line into coordination, and the 
FEC regulation similarly leaves room for interpretation; but, in combination 
the cases and regulations do identify the relevant factors and provide a good 
deal of guidance regarding when the coordination line is crossed. I do not 
intend to canvass the campaign finance cases in detail here as drawing the line 
between independent and coordinated actions is beyond the scope of this 
Article. The point, however, is that the line has been successfully drawn 
 
 256 See id. at 2722 (majority opinion).  
 257 See supra Part II.A. 
 258 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39, 44–45, 47–48 (1976); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
319 (2010). 
 259 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(b) (2012); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47. 
 260 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 
2010); Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Nader v. FEC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 53, 59 (D.D.C. 2011); Cao v. FEC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 498, 514–15 
(E.D. La. 2010); FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 92 (D.D.C. 1999); Colo. Educ. Ass’n v. Rutt, 184 
P.3d 65, 74–75 (Colo. 2008). 
 261 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a). 
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elsewhere, and there is no reason to think that courts cannot develop 
reasonably clear rules in the terrorism context as well.262 
Another, perhaps troubling, implication of restricting associational 
freedoms to peaceable associations is that the right of association has, in some 
respects, a significantly narrower scope than the rights of free speech and the 
press. In fact, this distinction is quite consistent with extant law. Although 
since 1969 the Brandenburg test has prohibited punishment of speech 
advocating violence unless it can be proven that the speech is linked to 
imminent and likely violence,263 the standard for association is much less 
demanding. Under the leading case addressing association and violence (the 
1961 decision in Scales v. United States264), membership in an organization 
with violent goals may be punished, consistent with the First Amendment, so 
long as the prosecuted individual’s membership is “active and purposive 
membership, purposive that is as to the organization’s criminal ends.”265 No 
proof of actual, imminent, or likely violence is required.266 
Moreover, there is some sense to a legal regime that is more suspicious of, 
and less willing to protect, groups that are directed to illegal and dangerous 
conduct as opposed to individuals acting on their own. Groups are powerful, 
and groups are dangerous. It is precisely because groups are powerful, and 
concomitantly, that individuals can only effectively participate in democratic 
governance as members of groups, that we protect the right of assembly and 
association in the first place.267 But the flip side of this principle is that just as 
groups can be powerful, so can they also be dangerous. The occasional 
Unabomber notwithstanding, the reality is that individuals pose a 
systematically lesser threat to the public than groups, and this is especially so 
 
 262 For a discussion of the coordination concept, arguing that the campaign finance definition does not 
translate well into the terrorism area, see generally Catherine A. Hardee, The Coordination Conundrum, 49 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 189 (2012). 
 263 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (allowing states to “forbid or 
proscribe advocacy . . . directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or 
produce such action”). 
 264 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
 265 Id. at 209, 229–30. 
 266 See id. at 229. For a similar argument, see Williams, supra note 109, at 391–92. It must be 
acknowledged that in Brandenburg itself, the Court briefly addressed freedom of assembly at the end of its per 
curiam opinion and suggested in a footnote that prosecution for assembly must satisfy the same requirements 
as prosecution of speech. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 n.4. Brandenburg, however, has not been understood 
to overrule Scales, as indicated by the fact that in Humanitarian Law Project the Court approvingly cites and 
describes Scales without any hint that it was inconsistent with Brandenburg. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010). 
 267 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 163, at 554–61; Bhagwat, supra note 7, at 993, 997. 
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in the context of First Amendment liberties. A single individual calling out for 
violence to an undifferentiated audience rarely creates a very high risk of 
violence, thus making the stringent protections of the Brandenburg test 
socially acceptable. But a group of individuals working together and 
encouraging each other to take up arms is quite a different matter. Such a 
group is more likely to form effective plans because groups can bring together 
a mixture of skills. And such a group is more likely to carry those plans 
through because an individual acting alone will often suffer doubts, but in a 
group setting such doubts can be assuaged. This insight regarding the 
dangerousness of groups underlies the law of conspiracy and provided the 
basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in 1927 to affirm Anita Whitney’s 
prosecution for criminal syndicalism in one of the foundational cases analyzing 
associational rights.268 
Once it is recognized that while the First Amendment provides broad 
protection to violent speech, it provides no protection to violent groups, many 
of the terrorism cases become much easier to reconcile with constitutional 
requirements. Most obviously, the many prosecutions based purely on financial 
contributions to an FTO, including Holy Land Foundation, Islamic American 
Relief Agency, Hammoud, and Afshari, become trivial. After all, even if a 
financial contribution qualifies as an act of association, as it surely should, 
there is simply no right to associate in any way with a violent group, making 
the act of association unprotected. 
Similarly trivial are the prosecutions, such as those of the Lackawanna Six 
and others brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2339D, for receiving weapons 
training from an FTO.269 In discussing the Lackawanna Six prosecution, I 
argued that one perplexing aspect of the prosecution was why the act of 
receiving weapons training from Al Qaeda provided any benefits to Al Qaeda 
as required by the material-support statute, § 2339B.270 That, however, is 
merely a statutory argument, not a First Amendment one (though it should be 
noted that when the Lackawanna Six traveled to Afghanistan in 2001, 
 
 268 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (“That . . . united and joint action involves even 
greater danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals, is clear. We 
cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of the 
State, unwarrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or association, or that those persons are 
protected from punishment by the due process clause who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an 
organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the State.”), overruled per curiam by Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 269 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 270 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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§ 2339D, the military training statute, had not yet been enacted).271 From the 
perspective of the First Amendment, not only is association with an FTO not 
protected, but in addition only peaceable forms of association and assembly 
are protected. A riot instigated by a previously peaceable group is no more a 
protected form of assembly than is a riot instigated by the Ku Klux Klan. But 
of course, the act of receiving military training is by no stretch of the 
imagination peaceable. Indeed, it would appear to be the polar opposite. The 
First Amendment therefore poses no barrier to prosecutions for such activities. 
It should be noted, moreover, that this reasoning applies fully to domestic 
organizations, and indeed does not appear to be limited to violent domestic 
organizations. If weapons training is not a form of peaceable association or 
assembly when engaged in with an FTO, it is no more so with a domestic 
militia group, or, for that matter, with the Boy Scouts. There is simply no First 
Amendment bar to prosecuting such behavior (whether there is a Second 
Amendment bar is a of course another question). 
Javel Iqbal’s prosecution can also probably be justified under this 
understanding of associational rights. Iqbal, recall, was prosecuted because he 
was paid by an FTO, Hezbollah, to rebroadcast the organization’s television 
station, Al Manar.272 While Iqbal’s and his associate Elahwal’s prosecutions 
were rooted in speech acts, it was critical to the rejection of Iqbal’s First 
Amendment defense that he had been paid by Hezbollah273—that the speech 
was not independent. That financial relationship constitutes a form of 
association unprotected by the First Amendment and so permissibly subject to 
prosecution, even if the same speech, engaged in independently, might well 
have been protected under Brandenburg. 
Jubair Ahmad’s prosecution follows a similar pattern. His recruiting video 
for the LeT would probably have constituted protected speech if produced 
independently, but it was not. It is true that Ahmad, unlike Iqbal, was not paid 
by an FTO for his work, but he did act under the direction of, and for the direct 
benefit of, a terrorist leader.274 That seems more than enough association to 
justify prosecution, even if again the speech alone is not. 
Finally, a focus on peaceable associations also throws useful light on the 
prosecution of Sami Al-Hussayen. Al-Hussayen was, of course, acquitted of 
 
 271 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 272 See supra Part II.A.1; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 75. 
 273 See Weiser, supra note 67. 
 274 See Karas, supra note 78. 
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the key terrorism charges against him,275 making the First Amendment issues 
somewhat moot. However, what the above analysis suggests is that if it can be 
demonstrated that an individual is intentionally creating mechanisms, including 
Internet links, that enable others to provide funding to an FTO, that should 
suffice to permit prosecution under the material-support statute and eliminate 
any First Amendment defense. Just as funding is association, so too is fund-
raising—indeed, most of the funding cases, including Holy Land Foundation, 
Islamic American Relief Agency, Hammoud, and Afshari, could easily be 
recharacterized as fund-raising cases, but the fact of association would surely 
not be affected. And if fund-raising in the direct form of collecting and 
forwarding money is unprotected, so surely is the act of channeling funds 
without taking possession oneself (so long as done knowingly). These are all 
essentially equivalent actions, with similar associational implications—after 
all, surely no one would question that creating a website to help raise funds for 
a protected association would itself be conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.276 When that fund-raising is for an unprotected group, however, 
First Amendment protections disappear. 
This is not to say, of course, that recognizing the lack of protection for 
violent groups solves all First Amendment problems in the context of 
terrorism. In particular, Tarek Mehanna’s prosecution remains problematic. He 
was prosecuted primarily for his speech without strong evidence that he was 
acting in association with an FTO.277 But under the analysis set forth above, 
the essence of a prosecutable crime, and the avoidance of the stringent 
Brandenburg standard, is association with a violent group. Absent evidence of 
such association, the prosecution boils down to one directed at pure, 
independent speech. And that is the realm of Brandenburg. There are 
admittedly complications that might justify the prosecution—in particular, 
 
 275 See O’Hagan, supra note 109. 
 276 Cf. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Straton, 536 U.S. 150, 160–64 (2002) 
(finding that an ordinance that required a permit to engage in door-to-door advocacy violated the First 
Amendment because it would have placed a burden on some speech). 
 277 See Abel, supra note 56, at 739–40. As noted earlier, the First Circuit abandoned this theory in 
affirming Mehanna’s conviction, see United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2013), and 
concluded (rather unconvincingly) that permitting the evidence supporting the government’s “translation-as-
material-support theory” to go the jury did not prejudice Mehanna. See id. at 59–64. But it remains true that 
the primary theory on which Mehanna was prosecuted in the trial court was based on his independent speech, 
and the trial court judge permitted this theory to go to the jury, despite the lack of evidence of coordination. Id. 
at 47. Moreover, though the district court instructed the jury that only coordinated speech violated the 
material-support statute, it failed to directly define coordination, see id. at 48–49, leaving open the possibility 
(which the First Circuit essentially ignored) that the jury convicted based on the theory of unilateral 
coordination that the government advanced. 
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there were suggestions by the government that Mehanna might have been in 
contact with Al Qaeda leadership, which would create the requisite 
association.278 But on the whole, the government’s prosecution of Mehanna 
without satisfying the Brandenburg standard for incitement poses severe First 
Amendment problems. 
V. DUAL-FUNCTION, COMPLEX, AND EVOLVING ASSOCIATIONS 
There is one last issue that requires attention. Under the analysis proposed 
here, constitutional protection (or lack thereof) turns critically on the goals and 
activities of a group. To implement a group-based rule, however, it is 
necessary to grapple with the complexities surrounding the nature and potential 
structures of different groups. Up to this point, the analysis in this Article has 
presumed that there is a clear demarcation between unprotected “violent” 
associations and protected “peaceable” ones. And, indeed, in many cases that 
line does seem quite clear. A group such as Al Qaeda, or for that matter the 
Mafia, is surely not a peaceable association under any definition because its 
primary function and operations are violent. Nor, as noted earlier, are groups 
such as Al Qaeda’s religious or political motivations relevant because the First 
Amendment limits its protections to peaceable assemblies, not peaceable, 
nonpolitical assemblies.279 The problem, however, is that not all groups are as 
easily classified as Al Qaeda because not all groups are so single-minded or 
monolithic. In particular, groups can have multiple goals, they can have 
complex structures, and they can change over time. While a full investigation 
of all of the possible permutations of group structure is impossible in this 
space, some preliminary consideration of the implications of the complexity of 
groups seems in order. 
A. Dual-Function Associations 
First, let us consider the problem of dual-function associations. What 
should the constitutional status be of groups that pursue both unprotected, 
violent ends, and protected, nonviolent ends? The answer to this question turns 
out to be extremely difficult, but critical. The reason it is critical is that dual-
function groups, which are characterized by a combination of violent and 
nonviolent goals and methods, are ubiquitous. For example, the two FTOs at 
issue in the Humanitarian Law Project litigation, the PKK and the Tamil 
 
 278 See Abel, supra note 56, at 734.  
 279 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Tigers, both concededly “engage[d] in political and humanitarian activities” in 
addition to terrorist acts.280 Similarly, as noted earlier, the FTO Hezbollah is an 
established political party in Lebanon and supports a vast array of nonviolent 
political and social activities alongside its violence.281 And even Hamas, the 
Palestinian group that is widely accepted to be a terrorist group, necessarily has 
substantial nonviolent activities, given that since 2007 it has been in effective 
political control of the Gaza Strip.282 The question that arises is whether a 
constitutional right exists to associate with such dual-function groups, so long 
as the association itself does not touch upon the group’s violent activities. Or 
put differently, do a group’s nonviolent activities partially immunize it from 
the constitutional consequences of its violent activities? 
The answer given by the Humanitarian Law Project Court to this question 
was quite clear: No. The Humanitarian Law Project majority emphasized that 
any material support given to an FTO, even material support directed at a dual-
function FTO’s nonviolent activities, nonetheless can end up advancing 
violence because material support is fungible.283 And the Court specifically 
rejected the view that only financial support is fungible.284 It must be 
acknowledged that some of the arguments advanced by the Court to defend 
this position, such as that material support lends “legitimacy” to FTOs,285 or 
that material support to an FTO might strain relations between the United 
States and its allies,286 seem forced because they fail to meaningfully 
distinguish association with an FTO from speech supporting an FTO. 
Ultimately, however, there is some force to Humanitarian Law Project’s basic 
conclusion, even if not to its reasoning. A group that systematically engages in 
violence, which by definition all FTOs do, is a violent group. The fact that a 
group is both violent and nonviolent does not mitigate that reality. And the 
associational right simply does not extend to violent groups. When an 
individual chooses to associate with a dual-function FTO such as Hezbollah, 
he or she is associating with that group, not some firewalled, nonviolent 
element of the group. Given the famous leakiness of firewalls and the 
 
 280 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010). 
 281 See Kulish, supra note 71. 
 282 See Steven Erlanger, Hamas Seizes Broad Control in Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, http:// 
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 284 See id. at 2725. 
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 286 See id. at 2726–27. 
BHAGWAT GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/7/2014 3:04 PM 
630 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:581 
impossible complexity of ensuring that different parts of groups do not support 
each other (especially when the relevant group operates abroad and 
illegally),287 it seems entirely reasonable, as a constitutional matter, for the 
government to define the act of associating with an FTO as associating with 
the entire FTO, the group, as opposed to with parts of it. For the same reasons, 
the Humanitarian Law Project Court appears to have been justified, both as a 
constitutional and statutory matter, to decline to interpret the material-support 
statute to require proof of a defendant’s intent to further the FTO’s illegal 
activities because, regardless of one’s intent, the fact of an unprotected 
association remains.288 For violent groups that have not been publicly 
designated as FTOs, it probably makes sense to require that an individual have 
knowledge of the group’s violence to avoid ensnaring the innocent; but intent 
is irrelevant. 
So, the First Amendment is probably best read not to protect dual-function 
groups. An important clarification must, however, be emphasized here. The 
definition of violent, unprotected assemblies and associations includes all 
groups that engage in, or are actively planning, violence. It does not cover 
groups that merely advocate violence in abstract terms. That is the learning of 
the Court’s foundational association decisions such as De Jonge v. Oregon289 
and Scales v. United States,290 and it also underlies Brandenburg291 and that 
case’s predecessor, Yates v. United States.292 An otherwise peaceable group 
does not become violent simply because its members discuss the 
permissibility, or even advisability, of violence under certain circumstances. 
To hold otherwise would be to severely restrict the protections of the First 
Amendment, eliminating many groups outside of a narrowly defined 
mainstream. This was the approach taken by the Court, and by the country, 
during the Red Scare and McCarthy eras of the 1920s and 1950s,293 but it is 
surely one the nation has regretted. Moreover, given the broad tools available 
to the government to target groups that pose any sort of tangible threat of 
violence, it also seems quite unnecessary in the battle against terrorism. Under 
 
 287 See id. at 2727–29. 
 288 Id. at 2717. 
 289 See 299 U.S. 353, 364–65 (1937). 
 290 See 367 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1961). 
 291 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam). 
 292 See 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (construing the Smith Act to forbid only “advocacy directed at 
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 293 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497–98, 509–11 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 363–64, 371–72 (1927), overruled per curiam by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449; Gitlow v. New 
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this approach, a domestic terrorist cell planning violence is completely 
unprotected no matter the extent of its nonviolent activities. But at the same 
time, a group that only discusses or even abstractly condones violence is fully 
protected, whether it be a gun rights organization advocating an anti–federal 
government reading of the Second Amendment, a group endorsing the virtues 
of jihad, or the Communist Party.294 
This limitation on the definition of violent associations to groups that 
engage in or actively plan violence is, for the reasons noted above, essential if 
the exception is not to swallow the general rule protecting associational 
freedoms. It must be acknowledged, however, that this principle will not 
always be easy to apply. The full question of the procedures, and strength of 
proof, that should be required before a group can be definitively designated an 
FTO is, as noted earlier, extremely complex and beyond the scope of this 
Article.295 It may well be, however, that the distinction between foreign and 
domestic groups relied upon by the Humanitarian Law Project Court296 might 
be of use here. While, as noted earlier, the complete exclusion of foreign 
associations from the protections of the First Amendment cannot be reconciled 
with the Amendment’s purpose to advance democratic self-governance, there 
can be no doubt that associations composed exclusively or primarily of citizens 
are more relevant to, and more directly connected with, the democratic process 
than primarily foreign organizations. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s own case 
law recognizes this point by upholding Congress’s plenary power to exclude 
aliens, even in the face of an admittedly colorable First Amendment claim,297 
and by upholding the denial of an individual’s request for a passport to travel 
to Cuba, despite the impact of the denial on the individual’s ability to gather 
information about Cuba.298 More broadly, the very existence of government 
policies, such as trade embargoes, and the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s 
 
 294 One question that arises is how to treat an act of association by an individual who believes that the 
group she has joined is nonviolent, but which is in fact a dual-function group. To grant no protection for such 
behavior could be quite chilling because it would discourage association with dissident groups absent a very 
high degree of confidence that the group is nonviolent. On the other hand, the Humanitarian Law Project 
Court was certainly correct to conclude that the government may legitimately bar association by individuals 
who do not intend to further an FTO’s violent ends, given the fungibility of money and other tangible 
resources. Perhaps the solution here is a mens rea requirement focused on knowledge, but not intent—
association may be punished if an individual is aware, or should have been aware, of a group’s violent nature 
even if the individual does not specifically intend to support violence. 
 295 See supra note 251. 
 296 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
 297 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764–70 (1972). 
 298 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). 
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undoubtedly correct recognition of the traditional deference given to the 
political branches on issues touching on foreign policy,299 clearly indicate that 
the government’s practical power to constitutionally restrict association with 
foreigners, while not unlimited, is greater than its purely domestic authority. 
There are thus good reasons to treat association with foreign groups as 
constitutionally protected but not quite as strongly protected as purely 
domestic associations. At the same time, it seems equally obvious that as the 
orientation of a group turns more violent, its relevance to democratic self-
governance becomes more marginal. It may be, therefore, that with respect to 
foreign groups, a somewhat lower quantum of evidence may be required to 
strip a group of protection on the grounds that it is violent than with a domestic 
group. Or, put perhaps more positively, it may well be that the Constitution is 
best read to require strong, positive proof that a domestic group has engaged 
in, or is actively planning to engage in, violence before a court will place it 
outside the bounds of the freedom of association, even if a similarly situated 
foreign group may be denied protection more easily. Of course, even under 
such an approach there will be intermediate instances of groups that possess a 
mixed domestic and foreign membership, but those will be relatively rare 
(especially because we are concerned here only with potentially violent 
groups) and can probably be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Complex and Evolving Associations 
Having multiple goals, some violent and some nonviolent, is not the only 
complication one runs into in considering how to delineate the scope of 
protected and unprotected groups under the First Amendment. Another set of 
problems arises when one considers the possibilities of complex organizational 
structures and of change within groups. Regarding structure, the obvious 
problem is that not all groups are unitary. Instead, many groups have more 
complicated structures. For example, some groups might be made up of local 
chapters as well as a national organization (examples include the Boy Scouts 
and the Sierra Club), or might be a loose federation of affiliated groups 
(examples include the Ku Klux Klan300 and the Tea Party movement). The 
obvious question raised by such entities is whether they should be considered a 
single association or assembly for First Amendment purposes, or as multiple 
 
 299 See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727. 
 300 See About the Ku Klux Klan, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/kkk/ 
default.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).  
BHAGWAT GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/7/2014 3:04 PM 
2014] TERRORISM AND ASSOCIATIONS 633 
groups. The answer has some significance because if the organization is treated 
as a single group, then systematic violence by any significant number of local 
chapters would taint the entire organization, denying it constitutional 
protection. Treating such organizations as multiple groups, however, would 
permit some local groups to retain protection by distancing themselves from 
the violence of their compatriots. 
Despite the importance of this question, however, it seems clear that a 
single, one-size-fits-all answer to the dilemma is impossible because of the 
enormous variation among groups. For many groups, moreover, the answer 
does not matter. Obviously, groups like the Boy Scouts and the Sierra Club 
will remain fully protected regardless of whether they are one or multiple 
groups because none of their components has violence as a significant goal. 
Similarly, it does not matter whether the various Al Qaeda affiliates, such as Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgred (AQIM), Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),301 are treated as separate groups or as part 
of an overarching Al Qaeda organization because all of the component groups 
as well as the parent group are dedicated to violence and so are unprotected. 
Clearly, however, there will be instances where a national network is largely 
peaceful but some local affiliates of that group commit themselves to violence. 
How should such groups be analyzed? 
The best that can be said here is that the answer must depend on the amount 
of integration, coordination, and central control the national (or international) 
network demonstrates. Organizations that demonstrate coherent, centrally 
formulated policy positions, and a commitment to discipline local chapters that 
deviate from them, clearly qualify as unitary groups. As the level of centralized 
control or cohesion declines, it becomes more likely that local affiliates can 
claim independent associational status. An important factor in all of this may 
well be the understandings of the group members—to what extent does their 
behavior evince a feeling of membership in, and commitment to, a larger 
organization as opposed to a smaller, more intimate subgroup. Finally, it may 
well be reasonable to insist, if a larger organization or a substantial number of 
its affiliates have demonstrated a commitment to violence, that any local group 
that wishes to retain protection must explicitly repudiate and break with those 
elements. These are, of course, general principles only, and their application to 
specific groups or organizations will depend on the nature of that group or 
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groups. It is also clear that some judgment, and some close cases, will be 
inevitable. But that is of course true of the scope of all constitutional rights. 
A related problem to the phenomenon of network groups is the problem of 
affiliation. Consider in this regard Sinn Fein, the Irish political party that 
allegedly shared close links with the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(Provisional IRA).302 Until it repudiated violence following the Good Friday 
Accords,303 the Provisional IRA surely constituted an unprotected, violent 
association because it had engaged in terrorism. But what of Sinn Fein 
(assuming that links between Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA could be 
proven, a point that Sinn Fein, it should be noted, has always denied albeit not 
especially convincingly)? Again, no simple answer could respond to infinite 
factual variations, but at a minimum, it seems clear that if a purportedly 
peaceful organization such as Sinn Fein has substantial leadership overlap with 
a violent group and coordinates with such a group in establishing policy and 
strategy, it forfeits its right to constitutional protection. Such a taint by 
association may seem unfair, but it is the only way to prevent violent, 
unprotected groups from creating sanitized affiliates, which in turn can 
strengthen the violent group by engaging in such activities as fund-raising and 
recruitment. Such a possibility would simply blow too large a hole in the 
state’s legitimate efforts to control and suppress violence and violent groups. 
In addition to organizational complexity, the Provisional IRA (and perhaps 
Sinn Fein) also nicely illustrates another problem with group definition—the 
possibility of evolution and change. As noted above, during the Troubles, there 
can be no doubt that the Provisional IRA was a violent, unprotected 
association, membership in which could clearly be punished consistent with 
the First Amendment. It is also true, however, that in the wake of the Good 
Friday accords, the leadership of the Provisional IRA has permanently 
renounced violence304 and also appears to have decommissioned its 
weapons.305 Can a formerly violent group repudiate violence and regain 
constitutional protections? This turns out to be a profoundly difficult question.  
 
 302 See Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/ 
gasf.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).  
 303 See IRA Statement, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jul/28/ 
northernireland.devolution.  
 304 See id.  
 305 IRA ‘Has Destroyed All Its Arms,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
northern_ireland/4283444.stm.  
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The problem lies in balancing a group’s (and its members’) interest in 
abandoning violence and returning to the political fold against the danger that a 
group’s purported conversion is not genuine, but rather an opportunistic 
attempt to regroup and perhaps rearm. Given the very strong governmental 
interest in preventing a violent group from reinvigorating itself during a phony 
abandonment of violence, it seems reasonable for courts to insist that before a 
group is considered to have moved beyond violence, there must be a full and 
unequivocal renunciation of violence by the group’s leadership and by most of 
its membership, expulsion of members who continue to plan violence, good 
evidence that the group is not maintaining weapons or other tools of violence, 
and most importantly, the passage of time to confirm the genuineness of the 
renunciation.  
On this view, a group such as the Provisional IRA may fairly be said, at 
this point in time, to have reformed itself and so recovered constitutional 
protections even though this could not have been said immediately after either 
the Good Friday Accords or even the Provisional IRA leadership’s 
renunciation of armed struggle in 2005.306 Similarly, the signing of the Oslo 
Accords by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its subsequent 
recognition of the State of Israel307 probably was not sufficient in itself to 
cleanse the group, but the passage of time and the group’s continuing 
renunciation of violence might at this point suffice.308 
A final, difficult example of an evolving group is the Ku Klux Klan. The 
question of constitutional protections for the Klan first came to the Supreme 
Court in 1928 in the New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman case.309 At issue in 
Bryant was the constitutionality of a New York statute that required 
membership organizations having twenty or more members, and requiring an 
oath as a condition of membership, to disclose their members and officers to 
the New York secretary of state, and criminalized knowing membership in an 
organization that had not complied with this requirement.310 Bryant was 
charged and convicted of being a member of the Klan, knowing that it had not 
 
 306 See IRA Statement, supra note 303. 
 307 Letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The Palestine Liberation Org., to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister 
of Isr. (Sept. 9, 1993), http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/is4.pdf. 
 308 This is not to say, of course, that individual members of these organizations are immune from 
punishment for past crimes. 
 309 See 278 U.S. 63 (1928). Thanks to John Inazu for pointing me to this issue, which he discusses in more 
detail in INAZU, supra note 47, at 50–51. 
 310 Bryant, 278 U.S. at 65–66. 
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complied with the statute.311 He challenged the constitutionality of the statute 
under the Fourteenth Amendment312 (the First Amendment was not explicitly 
evoked, presumably because the incorporation doctrine was quite undeveloped 
in the 1920s). The Court, by an 8–1 vote, rejected this argument, with both 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis joining the majority313 despite their many 
influential dissents in other free speech and assembly cases during this era. 
Critical to the Court’s reasoning was the fact that the Klan was well-known to 
be a violent organization that acted against racial and religious minorities, and 
so was distinguishable from organizations such as labor unions, which were 
exempt from the statute.314 Indeed, the Klan’s violence was precisely the 
grounds upon which the Court distinguished Bryant in NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson,315 the pathbreaking freedom of association decision recognizing 
the NAACP’s right to maintain the secrecy of its membership lists.316 Bryant 
and Patterson thus stand together as a strong, judicial endorsement of the 
principle that violent and nonviolent organizations are distinguishable for 
constitutional purposes, with the former entitled to fewer constitutional 
protections. They also appear to establish that the Klan is such a violent 
organization. 
But then the plot thickens. Forty-one years after Bryant, in 1969, the Klan 
was back before the Court in the famous Brandenburg decision.317 This time, 
however, the Court reversed the prosecution of a Klan leader on First 
Amendment grounds, invoking the Assembly Clause as well as the Free 
Speech Clause.318 What had changed? The Court’s laconic per curiam opinion 
in Brandenburg does not say (indeed, it does not even reference Bryant). As 
John Inazu points out, presumably one explanation might well be the Klan’s 
substantially reduced size, influence, and responsibility for violence by 
1969.319 In fact, however, this explanation is troubling. Klan groups were, after 
all, responsible for serious violence against civil rights protestors during the 
1950s and 1960s, not all that long before Brandenburg. Furthermore, unlike 
the Provisional IRA, the Klan had not, to my knowledge, repudiated violence 
 
 311 Id. at 71. 
 312 Id. at 65. 
 313 See id. at 73, 77. 
 314 See id. at 75–77. 
 315 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958). 
 316 Id. at 462–63. 
 317 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–45 (1969). 
 318 Id. at 449 & n.4. 
 319 INAZU, supra note 47, at 51. 
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as of 1969. As such, it seems likely that if the State of Ohio had wanted to 
simply proscribe the Klan in 1969 as a terrorist association, it could have done 
so consistent with the First Amendment. This is not to say that the result in 
Brandenburg was wrong. Insofar as Brandenburg’s conviction was based on 
his speech, as opposed to his membership in the Klan, the First Amendment 
clearly protected him. Furthermore, the Criminal Syndicalism statute that 
Brandenburg was convicted under, which proscribed assembling with a group 
that simply advocated violence,320 was clearly overbroad. So Brandenburg’s 
conviction certainly violated the First Amendment. But in 1969, the Ku Klux 
Klan was not entitled to constitutional rights of assembly or association. 
Of course, over half a century has elapsed since Brandenburg, and more 
since the Civil Rights Era. What of the Klan today? That is a most difficult 
question. On the one hand, the significance of the Klan and its connection with 
actual acts of violence has ebbed greatly over the years as the ideas with which 
the Klan is associated have become marginalized. This suggests that the Klan 
has “evolved” sufficiently to no longer qualify as a group that engages in 
violence (whatever it preaches). On the other hand, the Klan has historically 
been associated with grotesque violence and terrorism.321 To overcome that 
history, it would seem that a clear repudiation of violence would be necessary. 
This is complicated by the fact that the modern Klan is not a single 
organization; rather, numerous—sometimes competing—groups claim the title 
and mantle. Given this fact, the best answer would seem to be that a current 
group claiming to be the Ku Klux Klan is entitled to constitutional protection 
only if it has no recent history of violence and has clearly repudiated the 
Klan’s past violence. 
In short, groups are complex and changing, and so any constitutional 
doctrine granting protection, or denial of protection, for groups must wrestle 
with difficult boundary questions. This problem, however, is not unique to 
violent groups; it is raised by any legal rule that treats groups, qua groups, as 
special. And ultimately, while the boundary questions are difficult, they are 
not, as this discussion has hopefully demonstrated, unsolvable. 
 
 320 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. 
 321 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352–57 (2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
The freedom of assembly and association protected by the First 
Amendment is a fundamental constitutional liberty that plays a critical role in 
our system of democratic self-governance; it therefore cannot be allowed to 
weaken or narrow. Terrorism poses the most significant security threat the 
United States has faced since the end of the Cold War and perhaps the most 
significant domestic threat since World War II; the government must therefore 
possess the tools to effectively combat that threat. The questions this Article 
explores are whether the courts have successfully reconciled those two 
statements, and more broadly, whether they can be reconciled. As to the first 
question, it is quite clear that the courts have not identified any legal principles 
regarding the role of the First Amendment in the domestic War on Terror and, 
indeed, have barely made an effort in that direction. This Article has 
demonstrated, however, that the answer to the second question is at least a 
qualified yes. There does exist an understanding of the right of assembly and 
association, rooted in the text and history of the First Amendment, which 
retains a robust set of constitutional protections within their proper scope, 
while permitting prosecution of dangerous groups. 
Behind these debates, however, looms a much broader question. The truth 
of the matter is that in the thirty years following the Supreme Court’s 
pathbreaking reformulation of free speech law in its 1969 Brandenburg 
decision, First Amendment liberties were vigorously protected without much 
controversy because that was an era of relative geopolitical stability. In the 
wake of the September 11 attacks, however, the United States finds itself once 
again facing serious foreign and domestic threats. In this atmosphere, do either 
the courts or the nation as a whole have the will to continue to vigorously 
enforce the First Amendment in the face of perceived violence or subversion? 
The argument presented here supports the view that we absolutely can and 
should retain a strong First Amendment, at least in part, because the First 
Amendment, properly understood, does not force us into absurd choices. What 
legal analysis cannot answer, however, is whether we have the will to do so. 
 
